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Article
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the
Implications of Metamathematics
by
MARK R. BROWN*
and
ANDREW C. GREENBERG**
I. Introduction
The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement has for several years
criticized mainstream1 legal scholars' belief that "the law" can (and does)
determine outcomes in legal disputes. Critical scholars charge that this
vision of the law is an illusion; "legal formalism" does not exist. 2 Judges
are always free to make decisions-to determine outcomes-as they see
fit, relying on their own predilections, insights and life experiences.
The Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s, of course, made similar
arguments about indeterminacy in the law.3 Their challenge, however,
was more practical than theoretical in nature.4 The Critical Legal Stud-
* Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law. B.S. in Mathematics 1981,
University of Dayton; J.D. 1984, University of Louisville School of Law; LL.M. 1988, Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Law. We express thanks to Anthony D'Amato, Ken Kress, and John
Nowak for their comments and criticisms. We reserve to ourselves, of course, the responsibil-
ity for any errors of thought or expression.
** B.S. in Operations Research 1979; Ph.D. candidate in Computer Science, Cornell
University; J.D. candidate (1993), Stetson University College of Law.
1. For a description of mainstream legal thought, see Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 202-08 (1984).
2. See Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
239, 239 (1984) ("First, critical legal studies is a sustained attack on all types of formalism.
Second, that attack is also directed towards liberal political theory because some version of
formalism is essential to the coherence of liberal political theory.").
3. Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 633-
34 (1989).
4. See John M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of
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ies movement, in contrast, offers a thorough theoretical deconstruction of
contemporary American legal thought.5 Critical scholars charge that the
law fails-not only on an empirical level, but also in the abstract-to
achieve any measure of formalism. Simply put, the law cannot determine
cases. The law is, and can only be, indeterminate.6
To support this argument, Critical scholars have offered extensive
commentary on the limitations of human language.7 Language is subjec-
tive and imprecise, they argue, traits which the law (being dependent on
language) must share. Given the inherent limitations of language, the
Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 195, 208 (1980) [hereinafter Farago, Intractable Cases] ("The realists
...argue that concern about the certainty of a legal system is necessarily concern about
practice rather than theory."); see also Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1, at 204-05
(describing the Realists as questioning the "power of formal rationality," though only looking
for a more scientific method to reach shared ends).
5. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1, at 199 ("[CLS] adherents do not simply con-
test the practical policies yielded by traditional legal theory; they reject the very basis of the
theory itself."); see also Minda, supra note 3, at 640 ("CLS... practitioners have developed a
theoretical critique which 'transcends' law in its attempt to demonstrate the 'politics of rea-
son. "). Of course, Critical scholarship's divergence from mainstream thought involves more
than an argument over formalism:
[T]he difference between Critical and mainstream legal thought is that although the
latter rejects formalism, it persists in the view that some viable distinctions can be
drawn between legal reasoning and vulgar political debate. CLSers, on the other
hand, refuse to hedge on the indeterminacy of the legal order. They view the attempt
to tread some middle path as a desperate, face-saving effort to conceal the irremedia-
ble crisis within the legal process and the breakdown of the social order.
Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1, at 207 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
6. See Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1984). As Professor Singer states:
The issues raised by the Critical Legal Studies movement have brought nihilism
to center stage. Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is
not apolitical and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial
political choices, but use the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institutions
appear natural and our rules appear neutral. This view of the legal system raises the
possibility that there are no rational, objective criteria that can govern how we de-
scribe that system, or how we choose governmental institutions, or how we make
legal decisions. Critical Legal Studies thus raises the specter of nihilism.
Id. at 5.
7. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word
"Bird," 84 Nv. U. L. REv. 536 (1990) [hereinafter D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction];
Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L.
REV. 561 (1989) [hereinafter D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?]; Stanley Fish, Don't
Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777 (1988);
Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Stanley Fish,
Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299 (1983) [hereinafter Fish, Wrong Again]; Stanley Fish,
Working On the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551
(1982) [hereinafter Fish, Chain Gang]; Stanley Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60
TEX. L. REv. 495 (1982) [hereinafter Fish, Pluralist Vision]. For an argument that language,
despite its limitations, at times can and should restrict decision making, see Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism].
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
August 1992] LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND METAMATHEMATICS 1441
law cannot uniformly and objectively inform and constrain judicial
decisions."
Recently, mathematical theories and proofs have surfaced in debates
over indeterminacy in the law.9 Professor Anthony D'Amato, for exam-
ple, has argued that two related-though distinct-mathematical results,
the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorems' ° and Gddel's Incompleteness Theo-
rem,1' demonstrate that even if language is objective and precise, the law
still must prove inherently indeterminate. The L6wenheim-Skolem The-
orems, according to Professor D'Amato, reveal that a "'case' can be de-
cided either way consistent with any legal theory."' 12 Further, Gi5del's
Incompleteness Theorem proves that "legal, textual, and linguistic dem-
onstrations" must propagate "propositions (actually, an infinity of them)
that can neither be proved nor disproved."'13 Because plausible legal the-
ories support any position in any case, and because an infinite number of
indeterminate legal propositions exist, legal formalism is an impossibility.
Professor Ken Kress, in contrast, challenges the application of
mathematical proofs to the American legal system, and consequently
their usefulness in debating legal formalism. 14 He argues that certain
mathematical proofs, like those of Liwenheim and Skolem, "will not 'go
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 176
n.92 (1990) [hereinafter D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy]; D'Amato, Can Legislatures
Constrain?, supra note 7, at 597; Farago, Intractable Cases, supra note 4, at 226-29; John M.
Farago, Judicial Cybernetics. The Effects of Self-Reference in Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14
VAL. U. L. REV. 371, 409 n.128 (1980); Randall Kelso, G'del, Escher, Bach: More Darkness,
or Day for Night, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 822, 834 n.48 (reviewing DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER,
G6DEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979)); John M. Rogers & Robert E.
Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law From Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90
MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992). Even judges have begun to refer expressly to Gibdel's Theorem.
See, e-g., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing G6del's Theorem as
supporting the indeterminacy of any distinction between statements of fact and statements of
opinion); International Bankers Ins. Co. v. Snappy Car Rental, 553 So. 2d 740, 741 n.1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (describing self-contradictory applications of statutory language as
presenting "one of those Godel, Escher, Bach style 'through the looking glass' self-reference
loop-type problems").
10. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.B.2.
12. D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 597 n.96; see also D'Amato,
Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 175-76 & nn.91-92.
13. D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 597; see also Farago, Intrac-
table Cases, supra note 4, at 226-29 (arguing that law "is vulnerable to reasoning similar to
Gidel's," so that it "will need, in essence, an infinite set of axioms not derivable from any finite
starting point").
14. See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 134,
144-45 (1990).
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through' in legal English. ' 15 Further, Professor Kress asserts that be-
cause the technical meanings of mathematical terms "diverge substan-
tially" from "their legal homonyms," drawing analogies and conclusions
from mathematics is "a fallacy of equivocation." 16
In a different vein, Professors John Rogers and Robert Molzon pre-
sume that Godel's proof is germane to the law, 17 but attempt to diminish
the proofs relative importance.18 Specifically, they assert that even
though Gidel's legal analogue means that the law is indeterminate, the
conclusion that "any result is possible" does not necessarily follow.' 9 In-
stead, at least in the context of constitutional interpretation, Rogers and
Molzon argue: "If an interpretive technique is sufficiently indeterminate
to permit ten or twelve interpretations of a particular clause, that still
leaves millions of interpretations that are not permitted." 20 They thus
conclude that Gbdel's Theorem has only a limited impact upon the law.
Mathematical principles offer a host of information that might prove
inspiring for the law. The premier question is whether these principles
"go through" when words and legal logic are exchanged for numbers and
mathematical operations. The purpose of this Article is to explore the
legal applications of G6del's Incompleteness Theorem 2' and the proofs of
L6wenheim and Skolem22 in an attempt to assess their impact on legal
formalism.
15. Id. at 144.
16. Id. at 145.
17. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 9, at 992 ("Gddel's theorem strongly suggests that it is
impossible to create a legal system that is 'complete' in the sense that there is a derivable rule
for every fact situation."). In assuming that G6del's Theorem applies to the law, Professors
Rogers and Molzon almost certainly fall prey to Kress's "fallacy of equivocation." See supra
text accompanying notes 15-16. They rely upon a brief excerpt from a single mathematical
reference, confusing its technical terms (e.g., "higher order languages") with broader legal
homophones. See Rogers & Molzon, supra note 9, at 996-97 n.9 (G6del's theorem holds for
arithmetic and for higher order languages expressive enough to describe arithmetic.) (citing C.
Smorynski, The Incompleteness Theorems, in HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 821,
825-29 (Jon Barwise ed., 1977)). The cited work uses the term "higher order language" in an
extremely technical sense that does not necessarily include English. There, it referred to a
class of formally defined languages whose quantifiers extend to properties of objects as well as
to objects themselves. Smorynski, supra at 826, 829-30. It would be as much an error for a
student of jurisprudence to construe this mathematical term informally as it would be for a
layperson to presume that the legal term "malice aforethought" requires contempt and
premeditation.
18. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 9, at 1005-09.
19. Id. at 1008 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
21. See infra Parts III.B.2-4.
22. See infra Part IV.B.
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Mathematical proofs and their applications are often misunderstood
and misstated-by mathematicians 23 as well as lawyers. For the latter
the error is often compounded by legal training that encourages analogy.
We as lawyers are eager to analogize our field of study to other disci-
plines because our methodology teaches us to do so. Unfortunately,
analogies are sometimes false, leading to unsubstantiated assumptions
and gainsay.24 For this reason, though we are willing to assume here
that the law can be ideally structured to support formalism, 25 we attempt
to prove directly for the law what has been proved for mathematics. 26
Toward this goal, Part II of this Article explains formalism as com-
monly understood in the scientific and legal communities. Part III ad-
dresses the formidable question of whether legal formalism is feasible.
We first examine here the very basic issue of whether human language, or
better yet a subset known as "legal English," is objective enough to pro-
vide building blocks for a formal system. Tentatively assuming that legal
23. Consider the following remark:
Like all philosophical sceptical [sic] problems the issues raised by Gbdel's theo-
rems are pregnant with possibilities and fraught with dangers. Chief amongst the
latter is an inevitable tendency to become distanced from the fons et origo of these
developments. For it becomes ever more tempting and acceptable to rely on the
findings of commentators who might themselves have based their readings on earlier
summaries. To be sure, it is common practice to accept the verdict obtained by the
experts in a field without inspecting their findings. But such custom presupposes
concord.
S.G. Shanker, Preface to G6DEL'S THEOREM IN Focus at vi, vii (S.G. Shanker ed., 1988).
24. Compare, eg., D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 598 n.96 ("My
point is that if the Skolem-Lowenheim result is possible in mathematics-a deductive, precise
system-it is a fortiori possible in common-law adjudication.") and D'Amato, Pragmatic Inde-
terminacy, supra note 9, at 176 n.91 ("Only trivially can Lowenheim-Skolem or Godel be true
of English and not true of mathematics.") and Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law,
and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
83, 89 n.36 (1989) ("[In mathematics[,] a system of explanation cannot be simultaneously
complete and consistent. Ergo, there must be indeterminacy in any system of explanation.")
and Rogers & Molzon, supra note 9, at 992 (concluding that Gddel's proof "strongly suggests"
indeterminacy in the law) with Stuart Banner, Please Don't Read the Title, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
243, 253 n.33 (1989) ("the analogy [between Gbdel's theorem for mathematics and the law]
cannot be carried too far") and M.B.W. Sinclair, Notes Toward a Formal Model of Common
Law, 62 IND. L.J. 355, 363 n.33 (1987) (questioning "why we should think Godel's theorem
relevant to [the common-law] system.").
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. Consider Professor Douglas Hofstadter's remark on assumed extensions of Giadel's
Theorem: "It would be a large mistake to think that what has been worked out with the
utmost delicacy in mathematical logic should hold without modification in a completely differ-
ent area." DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, G6DEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN
BRAID 696 (1979) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID]; see also Girardeau A. Spann,
Secret Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV 669, 698-99 n.58 (1987) ("The differences between formal
logical systems and our less rigorous legal system are substantial enough that it is probably not
useful to attempt a direct application of Gddel's theorem to legal or philosophical analyses.").
English can support such a system, we next address the precise meaning
of Gidel's Theorem and how it speaks to mathematics. With this as our
groundwork, we lastly address whether the limitations of formalism, as
exposed by Gbdel's Theorem, also apply to the law. We conclude that
Gbdel's Theorem does in fact have a legal equivalent-a conclusion
drawn from an explicit proof, constructed in the style of Gi5del's Theo-
rem itself, which demonstrates the existence of an inherently indetermi-
nate proposition about the law.
Part IV then confronts the significance of such a proposition. A
legal equivalent of GiSdel's Theorem means not only that law cannot be
rendered consistent and complete, but also that it must contain an infi-
nite number of undecidable propositions. As is true of mathematics, law
is revealed as a wholly indeterminate system. Every case turns on human
judgment and intuition. Given this specific result, the proofs of Skolem
and Liwenheim are exposed as relatively unimportant for the law. Our
conclusion in Part IV that they in fact have no legal equivalent is thus
rendered largely irrelevant. Indeed, that the L6wenheim-Skolem proofs
do not "go through" to the law says nothing at all about the prospects of
legal determinacy. Instead, indeterminacy is revealed through direct
proof analogous to Gi5del's Theorem, with or without the assistance of
the distinct proofs of L6wenheim and Skolem.
II. In Search of Legal Formalism
When used in legal discourse, the term "formalism" has sometimes
taken on a pejorative connotation. Professor Frederick Schauer, for in-
stance, notes that "'formalist' is the adjective used to describe any judi-
cial decision, style of legal thinking, or legal theory with which the user
of the term disagrees."' 27 Though Professor Schauer's observation is
undoubtedly true, legal formalism also has a positive side. Indeed, for
reasons discussed below, 28 and notwithstanding its occasional conde-
scending reference, formalism is seen as the guiding principle behind the
law; formal reasoning is the hallmark of a good lawyer. Judge Richard
Posner goes so far as to state: "It is a safe bet that a majority of legal
professionals are formalists. ' '29
Because the legal understanding of formalism sometimes strays from
its technical meaning, we think it wise at this juncture to specifically de-
fine our terms and demonstrate what they describe. "Formalism," as
27. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 510.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1990) [hereinafter
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE].
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commonly understood by mathematicians, is the belief that decisions can
be completely and consistently rendered by way of a formal system. A
"formal system," in turn, is a reasoning process designed to mechanically
deduce truths from certain given assumptions, and consists of:
1. a definite description of symbols and syntax that allows proposi-
tions of the system to be expressed (that is, an objective
language);30
2. a set of axioms, defined as "a finite list of general propositions
whose truth, given the meanings of the symbols, is supposed to be
self-evident"; 31 and
3. a set of rules by which new propositions-theorems-may be in-
ferred from axioms and established propositions.32
A crucial characteristic of a formal system is that all of the system's
rules must be defined solely in terms of the system's language, and then
only in relation to the other rules within the system. The system's lan-
guage must be the only mechanism for communicating the relationships
among and between the rules of the system, and the rules themselves
must be the source of the information communicated. Thus, the results
derived from such a system depend solely upon the rules of the system
and its initial axioms.
Consider a classical formal system such as arithmetic. 33 Arithme-
tic's language includes certain well-defined operations such as
equivalency (=), addition (+), subtraction (-), multiplication (X), and
division ( ). Its proof rules implement certain logical operations, such
as "if P and Q are both true then P is true," as well as basic applications
of the arithmetical operations described above, such as "x + y = y +
x.' '34 These axioms and arithmetical operations provide the recipe for
deducing theorems and truths about the system. Using only the language
and rules of arithmetic, one can establish that "seven plus five equals
twelve." No outside information is used, nor can it be if the system is to
retain its formal character.
Formal proofs are algorithmic in nature. An "algorithm" is a finite
systematic procedure by which a solution to a given problem is achieved.
The procedure must terminate after a finite number of steps, and the
30. See ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEv MIND: CONCERNING COMPUTERS,
MINDS, AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS 102-05 (1989).
31. Id. at 104.
32. Id.
33. See HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 216-17; see also Farago, Intrac-
table Cases, supra note 4, at 201 ("[Arithmetic], like all formal systems, is a small collection of
initial assumptions (undefined terms and axioms) from which we can derive and thereby
demonstrate infinitely many additional propositions (theorems).").
34. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 216-17.
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operation at each step of the procedure must be well defined.35 Of criti-
cal importance is that the decision to be made in any given step must-
absolutely must-be definite, without deference to human judgment.
Arithmetical division of non-negative integers by positive integers
illustrates an algorithm. 36 Division is a systematic procedure for decid-
ing how many times one number will go into another number and what
remainder, if any, exists at the end of the procedure. It proceeds like
this: Given a dividend A and divisor B, while A is larger than B, replace
A by "A - B" and keep count of the number of times the replacement
occurs. When the replaced A becomes smaller than B, stop the proce-
dure. The number of times the replacement occurs is the quotient, and
the last A is the remainder. 37 The procedure is well defined and finite,
and will always yield the same result given the same input values for A
and B. 38
Because formal systems are algorithmic, their results are rigorously
objective and mechanically verifiable. Consequently, if one is secure in
the quality of the system's language and the self-evidence of its axioms,
one will also be secure in the objectivity of the system's results. Any two
individuals using the same proposition and the same formal system
should concur as to the truth or falsity of a given formal proof of that
proposition. Where the individuals differ, at least one of them can be
seen, by an objective and mechanical process, to have made a mistake. If
a grade school student learning her multiplication tables divides fifty-four
by six, for example, and produces a quotient other than nine, the teacher
can be confident that the student is wrong.39
Of course, all of this supposes formalism in an ideal state. Formal-
ism, remember, is the belief that a system will mechanically yield com-
plete, consistent, and "correct" results. As will be demonstrated later,40
systems that are constructed to reveal only formal truths (i.e., "design-
35. PENROSE, supra note 30, at 31. Penrose describes an algorithm as follows: "At each
step it is perfectly clear-cut what the operation is that has to be performed, and the decision as
to the moment at which the whole process has terminated is also perfectly clear-cut. More-
over, the description of the whole procedure can be presented infinite terms .... Id. (empha-
sis in original).
36. See id. at 31-33.
37. See id. at 32-33.
38. Note that the algorithm only gives valid results for those input values that are within
the scope of its formal definition. For example, it gives incorrect results when the dividend is
negative. More interestingly, the algorithm gives no result at all when the divisor is zero:
Because replacing A with A - 0 leaves A unchanged, the algorithm would proceed without
end-never producing an answer.
39. At least, if the student is unambiguously directed to be working in base 10.
40. See infra Part III.B.2.
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edly" formal systems) do not always succeed in their mission. As scien-
tists and mathematicians well know, no assurance can be given that even
a designedly formal system will always generate consistent and objective
results, or any results at all, in determining the validity of a given propo-
sition. Indeed, today when mathematicians refer to a given system as
"formal" they implicitly recognize that the system must prove either in-
consistent or incomplete.4'
For instance, rather than asking two students to verify whether six
goes into fifty-four nine times, suppose that the students are asked to
independently prove or disprove, using arithmetic, Fermat's Last Theo-
rem.42 Here, the two students might reach different conclusions without
either one of them having made an objective mistake-or more likely,
they might be unable to come up with any answer at all. Hence, systems
that are designed formally need not, by themselves, provide a result for
every valid query.43 Moreover, a system's capacity to mechanically vali-
date an answer, once derived, does not assure that the system will always
admit such an answer or that a contrary answer cannot also be obtained.
When a designedly formal system fails to render an objective answer
to a problem, the system is said to be "indeterminate." Indeterminacy
arises for two reasons. First, the system might be incomplete because its
axioms and procedures do not admit any proof or disproof for a given
proposition.44 If such is the case, the proof can be made only with in-
sights gleaned from without the system. Because such extra-systemic in-
sight is non-formal, the proof will be subjective, varying with the
individual. That a system is formally designed does not guarantee that it
will permit a proof or disproof for every proposition expressible in its
language.
Second, a system could prove indeterminate because of an internal
inconsistency.45 Its axioms (or combinations of axioms and proof rules)
41. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
42. Fermat's Last Theorem states that the equation x' + y' = z' does not hold for any
integers where x, y, and z are greater than zero and w is greater than two. The famous French
mathematician Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) made this assertion in the margin of Diophan-
tus's Arithmetica, but failed to offer a proof. See PENROSE, supra note 30, at 58. To date, no
one has proved (or disproved) Fermat's Last Theorem.
43. Nevertheless, scientists and mathematicians continue to use such systems, for they
remain useful, however imperfect.
44. See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE Es-
SENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN 263-64 (1985) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL
THEMAS]; cf Singer, supra note 6, at 14 ("A legal theory or set of legal rules is completely
determinate if it is comprehensive, consistent, directive and self-revising. Any doctrine or set
of rules that fails to satisfy any one of these requirements is indeterminate ... .
45. See HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS, supra note 44, at 263-65.
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might prove contradictory and yield conflicting results. This can be espe-
cially debilitating to a formal system, because a single inconsistency can
impeach the validity of every proposition within the system. In the pro-
positional calculus, 46 for example, every expressible proposition is deriva-
ble once another proposition and its negation have been proved. 47 The
ability to prove a single inconsistency would so infect the entire system
that all propositions (and their negations) would be true!48
Of course, inconsistency and incompleteness limit a designedly for-
mal system's value. Algorithms and formal systems are useful to scien-
tists and mathematicians because of their objectivity. Determinate
formal systems allow for precise predictions. Hypothetical data or data
collected through observation are entered into the system, which can
then be used to mechanically predict a future state of affairs. A determi-
nate formal system insures that results will be consistent, complete, and
"correct." Indeed, formal results are "communicable"; any person (or
machine) using the system can deduce them. 49
A. Comparing Legal Formalism
A determinate formal system of law would provide, for some, an
ideal state.50 Rules and procedures would exist to determine algorithmi-
46. The propositional calculus is a formal system for expressing compound and complex
propositions and their logical relationships. 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 733
(15th ed. 1991). For an elaborate but informal description of the propositional calculus, see
HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 181-97.
47. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 195-97 (proof that in propositional
calculus, "[f]rom a contradiction, everything follows").
48. Id. at 196. It should be noted that it is meaningless to state that two propositions are
inconsistent until one imposes an interpretation upon them. Id. at 94. For example, the pro-
positions "1 + 1 = 2" and "1 + 1 = 3" need not be inconsistent, even if we give the numer-
als and plus symbol ("+") their usual meanings; we might interpret "=" to mean "greater
than or equal to." It is only in light of a given symbolic interpretation that the notion of
formal consistency has meaning.
49. PENROSE, supra note 30, at 417-18. Consider, for example, classical Newtonian
mechanics. With the aid of formal mathematics, Sir Isaac Newton discovered that two bodies
attract each other in proportion to the product of their masses and the reciprocal of the square
of the distance between them (the "inverse square law"). Id. at 166. Using Newton's proposi-
tion (together with his derivative laws of motion), classical physical events can be accurately
predicted. Because the description of physical events is contained in a formal system, it is
objective and can be duplicated by anyone who knows the rules of the system.
50. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Ronald Dworkin, No
Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978). Professor Dworkin, perhaps more than anyone
else, holds that law can be complete and consistent. With his "rights thesis" he argues that
almost every case has a determinate answer. DWORKIN, supra at 82-90. Even when the case
emerges as a "hard" one, Dworkin suggests that a formal procedure can be employed to reach
the correct result. Id. at 81; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1759 (1991)
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cally the outcome in any and every case. Parties A and B would have
their dispute resolved in much the same way the number A is divided by
the number B. Each step would be well defined and definite and would
eventually direct a judge to the proper, determinate result.
At the turn of the century and until roughly the 1920s, many legal
scholars and jurists imagined that this perfect legal world actually ex-
isted.51 During this age of "conceptualism," disputes were supposedly
resolved by "rule of law," the equivalent of what we have described here
as a determinate formal system. Under this rule of law, there was no
room for judicial intuition or discretion.5 2 In Lochner v. New York 53 for
example, the Supreme Court declared (more or less) that socialism was
unconstitutional because it conflicted with a specific rule of law, that is,
"liberty of contract," required by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.5 4 The Court pretended, or perhaps genuinely be-
lieved, that the result was somehow compelled by the Constitution. 5
Lochner's result was thus seen as a discovery and not a development.
Justice Holmes observed in his dissenting opinion in Lochner that
the Constitution did not compel the Court to read the Due Process
Clause to preclude social legislation 6-an opinion shared by followers of
the Realist movement and most scholars today.5 7 Modern thought rec-
ognizes that the Court in Lochner was making policy rather than discov-
ering the commands of the Constitution.58 Because the Due Process
("Among contemporary jurisprudential writers, Ronald Dworkin might appear a spiritual heir
to Blackstone. Like Blackstone, Dworkin depicts law as a seamless web, and he maintains that
all legal questions have one right answer.").
51. See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 1, at 203.
52. Id.
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. See id. at 53, 57-58, 61, 64.
55. See, e.g., id. at 56 (framing the issue as whether the challenged statute was "a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State [or] an unreasonable,
unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual" to freely make con-
tracts); id. at 56-57 (denying that this involved "substituting the judgment of the court for that
of the legislature"); id. at 61 ("We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold
this law. On the contrary, we think that a law such as this ... is an illegal interference with
the rights of individuals ... to make contracts ... .
56. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
57. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 511 & n.2. But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that
the Takings Clause precludes social legislation). Consider the comments of Professor Joseph
Sax: "The pity is that [Epstein] has become the prisoner of an intellectual style so confining
and of a philosophy so rigid that he has disabled himself from seeing problems as beyond the
grasp of mere formalism." Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 293 (1986) (book
review).
58. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 511 ("The formalism in Lochner inheres in
Clause offers only a vague command to the courts, using it to mechani-
cally determine the outcome in any given case is impossible.5 9
Holmes's specific objections in Lochner were foreshadowed by his
more general comments about jurisprudence in The Common Law,60
where he wrote: "The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and
never reaching, consistency. ' 61 Holmes further speculated in The Path
of the Law62 that "[t]he language of judicial decision is mainly the lan-
guage of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for
certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."'63 Holmes
thus illustrates that even during conceptualism's heyday, skeptics ques-
tioned the law's ability to achieve consistency and completeness. 64
Notwithstanding Holmes's reputation as perhaps the greatest jurist
of modem times, mainstream scholarship continues to teach formalism
within.the law.65 The argument is that although cases impeaching the
law's completeness and consistency might arise, the vast majority of dis-
putes have singular, determinate answers. The law provides solutions
its denial of the political, moral, social, and economic choices involved in the decision, and
indeed in its denial that there was any choice at all.").
59. For instance, as contrasted with the Lochner Court's conclusion, Professor Mark
Tushnet makes a persuasive argument that the Constitution compels socialism. See Mark V.
Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 696-701 (1979) (reviewing LAWRENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
60. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown 1881).
61. Id. at 36; see also DANIEL KORNSTEIN, THE MUSIC OF THE LAWS 124 (1982).
62. O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
63. Id. at 465-66.
64. KORNSTEIN, supra note 61, at 128 ("Holmes's creativity is shown by his perceiving,
while focusing on law, the limitations that circumscribe any axiomatic and deductive system of
a reasonable richness.") (emphasis in original).
65. Although most lawyers, judges, and professors are willing to admit that the law is not
technically, strictly formal, they continue to treat it as such. See, eg., POSNER, JURISPRU-
DENCE, supra note 29, at 41 (noting that "a majority of legal professionals are formalists"); see
also Rolf Sartorius, Bayes' Theorem, Hard Cases, and Judicial Discretion, 11 GA. L. REv.
1269, 1269 (1977) ("There is a uniquely correct result in the vast majority of cases ....");
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 546 ("[L]et me satisfy myself here with the unproved
empirical conclusion that linguistic instructions are sometimes potent. If such instructions
sometimes create presumptions, and if those presumptions sometimes work, then what does
this say about the possibility of what we might call a presumptive formalism.") (emphasis in
original). Courts offer conclusions as if no other result could be allowed and scholars write
articles that purport to explain the law (as it is or as it should be). See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter,
111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) ("An intent requirement is either implicit in the word 'punish-
ment' or is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as policy considerations might
dictate."); Donald H. Reagan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (arguing that all modern
Supreme Court cases invalidating state laws under the Commerce Clause can be singularly
explained).
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either by clear command or by way of legal "theory." 66 "Legal formal-
ism" thus instructs that the law almost always resolves societal disputes.
Only in the rarest of cases must the judge look elsewhere for answers.67
And never must a judge flip a coin or guess at the proper legal result. 68
Of course, a cursory empirical examination of Supreme Court deci-
sions might lead one to question this assertion. The 1990 Term of the
Supreme Court, for example, produced a plethora of divided opinions, 69
many hopelessly So. 70 If Justices of the Supreme Court, the most
respected legal minds in the country, can only occasionally agree on the
law's meaning, how can one credibly assert that the law is normally
determinate?
66. For example, Judge Posner argues that simple economic theory explains many of the
results obtained under the law. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
(1981). Professor John Hart Ely offers a process-oriented approach to explain the role of the
judiciary in safeguarding the rights of individuals. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST (1980). Common to these theories is their implicit assumption that if used they can and
do direct outcomes. They are attempts at achieving formality.
67. See Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indetermi-
nacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1233
(1990) ("IT]he new legal formalism is properly considered to be a type of formalism to the
extent that it maintains that something internal to law rather than some extra-legal norms or
processes determines juridical relationships and serves to separate the latter from non-juridical
social relationships, including political ones.").
68. Of course, modern formalists must recognize the litigious nature of American society
and the enormous number of suits currently pending in most courts' dockets. Arguably, this
large number of cases supports the Critical claim of legal indeterminacy. One response to this
observation might be that the large amount of litigation in the United States is not so much a
function of indeterminacy in the law as it is a result of factual uncertainty. The facts of most
cases simply are not clear. Without clarity in the input-the facts of a case-the output can-
not be accurately predicted. Hence, cases are frequently tried in order to resolve factual ques-
tions. Once discovery is complete and the trial is over, however, the law determines the
outcome.
Even assuming that factual uncertainty accounts for much of the current litigation, cer-
tainly not all of it can be attributed solely to factual disputes. Many cases with stipulated or
established facts are still contested, as indicated by the large number of appellate cases that do
not delve into factual matters. In any event, factual uncertainty is not at issue in the current
determinacy debate. Instead, the challenge raised by the Critical Legal Studies movement
focuses on the legal rules that apply to established facts. Critical scholars charge that determi-
nacy cannot exist even at this level. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note I, at 199; cf Anthony
D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1313, 1347 (1990) (arguing that courts can manipulate facts just as easily as they can manipu-
late law).
69. Roughly three-quarters of the Court's 120 full opinions rendered during the 1990
Term were divided. "Divided" cases are those in which either a dissenting opinion or a con-
curring opinion that disagreed with the Court's reasoning was filed. See The Supreme Court,
1990 Term-The Tables, 105 HARV. L. REV. 419, 421 (1991) (Of 120 full opinions, 85 in-
cluded either dissents or concurrences disagreeing with the majority's reasoning).
70. In addition to several plurality opinions, the Court rendered twenty-one 5-4 decisions
during the 1990 Term. See id. at 422.
Professor Schauer has responded to this particular argument by not-
ing the discretionary nature of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.71 Be-
cause the Justices choose only to hear difficult, indeterminate cases,
Professor Schauer argues, "the Supreme Court, far from being the first
place to look for easy cases, ought to be the last place."72 Moreover, the
bulk of the Court's docket consists of constitutional cases in which the
open-ended language of the Constitution more readily gives rise to
dissent.
Lower courts, in contrast, are less divisive, especially where consti-
tutional law is not at issue.73 Consensus over the outcome of legal issues
is more common in state and lower federal courts,74 but unanimity is by
no means common enough to allow a confident proclamation that the
71. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 409 (1985) [hereinafter
Schauer, Easy Cases]. Prior to 1988, the Court was required pursuant to its appellate jurisdic-
tion to hear only a small number of cases, including those where a state court had either struck
down a federal statute or adjudged a state statute valid in the face of a possible conflict with
federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257(l)-(2) (1982) (amended 1988), those cases where a federal
court of appeal had struck down a state statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982) (amended
1988), those cases to which a federal agency or officer was a party and any federal court had
struck down a federal statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) (repealed 1988), and those cases in
which judgment was issued by a panel of three district judges under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, see 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1988). Today, the Court's jurisdiction is almost completely discretionary, see
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1988), these mandatory categories having been, except for the last
mentioned above, eliminated by Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 1-3, 102 Stat.
662, 662.
72. Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 409; cf Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Decon-
struction: Refuting Indeterminacy With One Bold Thought, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 113, 116
(1990) [hereinafter D'Amato, One Bold Thought] ("The Supreme Court, I contend, is no
longer a court that decides cases. It has become in the last fifty years or so a legislative body
which uses a case simply as a serendipitous vehicle for enacting social legislation.").
73. See D'Amato, One Bold Thought, supra note 72, at 114 (noting statistical studies
which conclude that "dissents were filed in less than four percent of [appellate decisions in
federal courts]") (citing Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The
Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 204 (1984) and Alvin B. Rubin,
Doctrine in Decision-Making: Rationale or Rationalization, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 357, 367).
Still, Professor Schauer admits that even in lower appellate courts, "there are few, if any, easy
cases." Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 411. See generally D'Amato, Pragmatic Inde-
terminacy, supra note 9, at 162-63 (discussing Schauer's contentions).
74. Schauer argues:
In [lower federal and state appellate courts], at least with respect to appeals of right,
... there are many cases that would be perceived by the court involved, the academic
world, other external observers-indeed by everyone except the appellant-as easy.
In these instances, claims are either upheld or denied on the basis of little more than
mechanical application of existing rules with little anguish on the part of the court.
See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 410 (footnote omitted). But see D'Amato, Prag-
matic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 163 (observing that even in lower appellate courts plausi-
ble arguments exist for both sides in every case).
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law is determinate. 75 Perhaps the best that can be said is that in the
appellate courts the law sometimes seems consistent and complete while
at other times it appears confused and contradictory.
Explanations for occasional departures from the formal ideal can be
readily imagined. One might argue that some judges (as well as lawyers
and professors) simply are not as smart as others. And even intelligent
judges make mistakes.76 Either of these contingencies could explain
some of the judicial disagreement about the law.
Moreover, one might respond to the inconsistencies and dissenting
opinions found in the various reporters by observing that reported cases
represent only a very small percentage of the controversies and transac-
tions that occur in the United States each day. The vast majority of
transactions occur without incident, the argument goes, because the law
informs people of their rights and obligations. 77 Stores sell goods, for
example, without ever having to resort to the courts. These "cases"
never go to court because they are determinate. 78
Of those cases that do wind up in court, only a small portion are
appealed and reported. Most cases are routinely resolved at trial, with
little or no dispute about the proper rules of law.79 In only a very few
cases is the law ever seriously contested, and these are the cases that
work their way into the reports. Given the nature of these reported
cases, it is not surprising that there should be dissent and inconsistency.
Apologetic arguments of this nature reflect a rather bald admission
that the law is not truly formal. 80 Formalism is not so loose a concept
75. Professor D'Amato concludes that a low rate of dissenting opinions tends to prove
the law's indeterminacy rather than its determinacy:
Given the deconstructionist's view that law does not constrain a judge's ruling in any
given case, there is little point in dissenting. A decision in any case is reached by the
brute force of majority rule. The majority was not constrained by law to reach the
decision it reached, as the minority well knows. Hence there is nothing to be gained
by dissenting.
D'Amato, One Bold Thought, supra note 72, at 115.
76. See Rogers & Molzon, supra note 9, at 1000 ("[T]here are many misapplications of
the law. The law may still be assumed consistent even though different judges make inconsis-
tent determinations on indistinguishable facts.") (emphasis added).
77. See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 412 ("Every time some claimed grievance
stays in the lawyer's office because litigation seems futile, we have an easy case.").
78. Id. But see D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 166-71 (disputing
that such cases are easy or determinate).
79. See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 411 ("Few cases that are filed reach final
decision after a full evidentiary hearing. Many are settled, and many others are decided by the
various devices designed to sort out the hard cases from the easy ones, particularly summary
judgment and dismissals on the pleadings."). But see D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy,
supra note 9, at 163 ("[N]o easy case is anywhere to be seen in trial court.").
80. Professor D'Amato notes that most legal scholars today attempt to "have it both
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that it can only generally exist; either it does or it does not.81 Any accu-
rate description of the American legal system must recognize that the
law has yet to achieve determinate formality. This acknowledgement,
however, does not answer the normative question of whether the law can
operate in a determinate, formal fashion. Perhaps these imperfections in
the law can be corrected. Maybe the current indeterminacy in the law is
only contingent; practical difficulties such as imprecise drafting, miscom-
munication, or even simple human error may be the causes. Controlling
for these practical contingencies, the question then is the normative one
of whether the law-in theory-can be ideally formalized.
B. Why Aspire to Legal Formalism?
Before proceeding, one might inquire of the importance of legal for-
malism. The formal ideal has appeal to the legal system for at least three
reasons. First, because of its objectivity, a determinate formal system
would restrict the amount of discretion reserved to the judiciary and
thereby promote the American vision of democratic government. 82 The
United States has evolved into a body politic where universal suffrage is
the norm.8 3 Governmental power is expected to flow from the people
ways" by relying on formal argument when it suits them, and then shifting to indeterminacy
analysis when necessary. Anthony D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of Plain Meaning,
33 ARIZ. L. REv. 529, 539-40 (1991) [hereinafter D'Amato, Consequences of Plain Meaning].
81. Compare Kenney Hegland, Indeterminacy: I Hardly Knew Thee, 33 ARIz. L. REv.
509, 515-18 (1991) (arguing that some indeterminacy exists in the law) with D'Amato, Conse-
quences of Plain Meaning, supra note 80, at 551 (Believing that the law is indeterminate but the
world outside the law is determinate "is the same mental manipulation that the majority of
legal scholars engage in today, when they say, along with Professor Ken Kress, that there is
'some' indeterminacy in the law but there is also a great deal of determinacy.").
82. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1, 2 (1971) ("The requirement that the Court be principled arises from the resolu-
tion of the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy in a democratic society. If the judiciary
really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the society is not democratic."); Eric
Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1682 (1991) (reviewing POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 29) ("But why should unelected judges' beliefs about morality or
sound policy prevail in a democratic polity when they depart from the views of elected officials
or the citizenry generally?"); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) ("Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate clarity or
precision are criticized, on that account, as undemocratic .... ").
83. Of course, this evolution took time, several constitutional amendments, and the
assistance of the Supreme Court. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (right to vote shall not be
denied on account of race); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (right to vote shall not be denied on
account of sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (right to vote shall not be denied on account of
failure to pay poll tax or other tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (right to vote shall not be
denied to citizens that are 18 years of age or older on account of age); Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 821 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a state law that restricted the right to
vote in school board elections to land owners or lessors and parents or guardians of children
enrolled in public schools); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 863 (1966) (holding
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through their elected representatives, not from the judiciary.84 Making
law is a job for the legislature. Entrusting the judicial branch with exces-
sive discretion in interpretation and application of the law contradicts
this republican ideal. Formalism in the law thus promotes the American
political philosophy by strictly limiting judicial discretion.
State judges, of course, are sometimes elected8" and therefore can
possess a measure of representative authority. 86 Nevertheless, even
elected judges are expected to decide cases in a determinate, formal fash-
ion. Republicanism, therefore, cannot form the sole basis for aspiring to
formality. And indeed it does not. Formalism has among its primary
attributes certainty and reliability,87 qualities that endear themselves to
the law both for their own sake and because they promote fairness and
equality. Legal formalism allows people to accurately predict the legal
consequences of their actions, 88 which in turn fosters reliance and fair-
ness within the American legal system. Perhaps more important, the cer-
tainty achieved through formalism insures that like cases are treated
alike-thus assuring equal treatment under the law.89
unconstitutional a state law that conditioned the right to vote on the payment of a tax); Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a state's legislative apportionment
system that diluted some citizens' right to vote).
84. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 (guaranteeing to the states "a Republican Form of
Government").
85. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.011-105.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (providing
for election of judges). Federal judges are not elected, but are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Supreme Court Justices); 28
U.S.C. § 44 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (judges of courts of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990) (judges of district courts).
86. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2367 (1991) ("When each of several members
of a court must be a resident of a separate district, and must be elected by the voters of that
district, it seems both reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners as representatives of
that district.").
87. See Norman Barry, The Classical Theory of Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 286
(1988) ("Law deals with the actions of private agents and has no purpose beyond providing a
predictable framework for individuals to pursue their private ends with the minimum of colli-
sion with each other."); Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 539 ("One of the things that can
be said for rules is the value variously expressed as predictability or certainty."); see also JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-71 (1980) (discussing the value of relia-
bility and predictability).
88. See Scalia, supra note 82, at 1179 ("[A]nother obvious advantage of establishing as
soon as possible a clear, general principle of decision [is] predictability.").
89. See id. at 1178 ("The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any other
provision of the Constitution. And the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to
judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well."); see also Anthony
D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?, 11 GA. L. REv. 1277, 1300-01 (1977)
[hereinafter D'Amato, Computers] (arguing that formalism would obviate judicial bias, en-
hance equality, and prove economically efficient); Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning
Finally, formalism tends to reinforce society's belief in the mystical
"rule of law." Chief Justice Marshall stated almost two centuries ago in
Marbury v. Madison90 that "[t]he government of the United States has
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men." 91
Maintaining an objective system-one that is distinct from the people
who administer it-is important because a detached legal system appears
credible and perpetual. Regardless of the failings of those who manage
the system, and notwithstanding the system's ever-changing personnel,
the law retains respect and continuity. In short, formalism promotes the
legitimacy of the American legal system.
Paradoxically, many mainstream scholars eschew formalism even
while praising it. Professor Schauer, for example, answers the question,
"[W]hat is so good about decision according to rules?" 92 by flatly stating,
"[N]othing. ' '93 Judge Posner likewise questions the value of formalism:
"Law can be highly objective and impersonal, yet thoroughly unjust."'94
He accordingly proclaims: "I am not a formalist." 95 And Norman
Barry, a Professor of Politics at the University of Buckingham, offers a
normative observation that "legal reasoning cannot be mechanistic or
deductive."'96
Still, in law schools across the country and in virtually every court-
room, the formalist ideal remains paramount. Even Professor Barry,
though renouncing "mechanistic" legal reasoning, argues that "[i]t is not
the function of the judge to bring about some desirable state of affairs but
to find objectively the right decision within the general system of rules, a
system that exists independently of judicial activity itself."'97 American
culture demands determinacy and abhors license. Equity is the excep-
tion, not the rule. Instead, the rule is one "of law"-the law defined in
determinate terms. 98 Given that this ideal exists, we turn to the critical
issue of whether it is necessarily an illusion.
and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45, 55 (1985)
("[J]udges should treat like cases alike.").
90. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
91. Id. at 163.
92. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 539.
93. Id. Schauer also criticizes formalism by observing that "rules get in the way." Id.
Schauer thus favors rules, but only those rules that do not constrain the decisionmaker too
much.
94. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 29, at 38.
95. Id. at 33.
96. Barry, supra note 87, at 285; see also Hegland, supra note 81, at 578 (finding a "for-
malist definition of justice" to be "repugnant").
97. Barry, supra note 87, at 285-86 (emphases added).
98. Professor D'Amato has also offered his views on the costs of formalism. He observes
that true formalism will (1) "freeze[ ... precedents"; (2) "render areas of the law uninterest-
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III. Is Formal Law Possible?
A. The Problem of Linguistic Vagueness
As stated above, one requirement of a formal system is that its rules
and syntax be certain and well defined.99 One who implements the sys-
tem must not have room for judgment as to what the rules mean and how
they are to be applied. In arithmetic, for example, one must know that
"=" means equivalency. No room for disagreement on this point can
exist, given the terms of the formal system.
A good deal of Critical scholarship has addressed whether language,
and thus law, can be sufficiently defined so as to foster formalism. Pro-
fessor Stanley Fish, for example, has argued that language is inherently
subjective and thus cannot guide judges in any objective, neutral fash-
ion.1l° Judges are always free to decide cases notwithstanding the lan-
guage of statutes and corresponding rules of interpretation. 101
Mainstream scholarship's rejoinder to Professor Fish's argument
has proceeded along the same lines as its response to empirical observa-
tions of indeterminacy in the law. The response may be paraphrased as
follows: "True, language is occasionally vague, but normally it is not.
Many words are certain and fixed, so that at least in regard to this large
portion of language formalism can be achieved.' 0 2 Professor Schauer,
for example, has responded to Professor Fish's argument by observing
ing"; (3) "dehumanizeD" the law; and (4) perhaps affect the "quality of decisions on substan-
tive law." D'Amato, Computers, supra note 89, at 1298-1300.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
100. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); Fish, Pluralist
Vision, supra note 7, at 503 ("Any text, whatever its conditions of production, is capable of
being appropriated by any number of persons and read in relation to concerns the speaker
could not have foreseen."); Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 7, at 564 ("The crucial point is that
one cannot read or reread independently of intention, independently, that is, of the assumption
that one is dealing with marks or sounds produced by an intentional being, a being situated in
some enterprise in relation to which he has a purpose or a point of view.") (emphasis in origi-
nal); Fish, Wrong Again, supra note 7, at 314 ("[I]t is precisely my thesis (with which of
course one might quarrel) that in whatever way one establishes an interpretation, one will at
the same time be assigning an intention."); cf J.L. AUSTIN, The Meaning of a Word, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL PAPERS 55-75 (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds., 3d ed. 1979) (explaining that
words have no meaning outside the context of at least a sentence).
101. See, e.g., D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 562 ("My starting
point, however-in alignment with Stanley Fish-is that there can never be a definitive theory
or set of rules of interpretation.").
102. See, e.g., Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 418-20; Schauer, Formalism, supra
note 7, at 512-14. Schauer thus attempts to marginalize the problems raised by linguistic
vagueness:
More commonly, however, the indeterminacy to be filled by a decisionmaker's choice
is not pervasive throughout the range of applications of a term. Instead, the indeter-
minacy is encountered only at the edges of a term's meaning. As H.L.A. Hart tells
that certain words have "inexorable" meanings: "When I say that peli-
cans are birds, the truth of the statement follows inexorably from the
meaning of the term 'bird.' If someone disagrees, or points at a living,
breathing, flying pelican and says 'That is not a bird,' she simply does not
know what the word 'bird' means." 103 Likewise, some rules are clearer
than others, and certain cases are easier than others. 104
The stakes in the debate are high. If language is subjective, then law
cannot be given formal structure. Two judges might come to different
conclusions about a given rule's meaning because the words of the rule
mean different things to each judge. The law could not function in an
algorithmic fashion because of the vagueness presented by its language.
In mathematical terms, it would be like trying to divide fifty-four by six,
but allowing the meanings behind "fifty-four" and "six" to vary with the
interpreter.
On the other hand, if language is objective, the law at least has the
potential for being cast as a formal system. The primary question here is
exactly how objective must language be. Mathematics makes use of a
rigorous written language that is universally understood-at least by
those who dabble in the field. This objective language then provides the
framework for constructing formal mathematical models and systems.
Can everyday language achieve this same level of certainty?
Nothing peculiar to human language would appear to preclude for-
malism within an appropriate interpretive community.10 5 Granted, be-
cause of language's richness and tendency toward ambiguity, it suffers a
greater potential to develop subjective qualities than does arithmetic or
calculus. As a practical matter, language might never overcome these
us, legal terms possess a core of settled meaning and a penumbra of debatable
meaning.
Id. at 514. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
103. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 512 (footnote omitted).
104. Professor D'Amato has responded cleverly to Schauer's example of an "inexorable"
meaning by suggesting that "the 'that' in the speaker's sentence refers to herfinger .... That'
is a finger, she is asserting, not a 'bird.'" D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction, supra note 7, at
538 (emphasis in original). D'Amato concludes: "Language is so wonderfully variable, and its
nuances so infinitely rich, that the notion of omitting all interpretations not imagined by a
given law professor is worse than incoherent and worse than impossible-it is uninteresting."
Id. at 540-41.
105. See Fish, Pluralist Vision, supra note 7, at 498 ("[T]here is nothing in principle to
prevent the emergence of a unified legal interpretive community.... As an institution the law
would then be in the happy state (if it is happy) enjoyed by certain branches of the physical
sciences . . ").
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hurdles-thus leaving legal formalism as an impossible dream.10 6 But as
an abstract matter, this need not be so.
The language of arithmetic can certainly be misunderstood or misin-
terpreted. Indeed, just as a person might misunderstand the word
"bird," a person might subjectively develop her own meaning for the
symbols of arithmetic. The numeral "2" might, for instance, mean sev-
enteen to a particular person, making it impossible to communicate ar-
ithmetically with her.107 This possibility, however, does not destroy the
usefulness of arithmetic as a formal system. It simply means that this
unique individual is operating within a different system--one all her
own-and that communicating with her might prove difficult.
Similarly, that people disagree over the meaning of a particular
word should not be taken as an abstract proof of the limits of human
language. Disagreement over meaning cannot be taken to demonstrate
inherent subjectivity; rather it would appear to present more of an empir-
ical observation. To date, nothing approaching a verifiable proof estab-
lishes that human language (and hence legal English) cannot form the
basis for a formal, logical reasoning system. Such a system may be im-
possible, but that has yet to be determined. At least as far as the predi-
cate language supporting the system is concerned, if mathematical
symbols can succeed then so can legal English.108
Answers to this question might be uncovered by the emerging study
of artificial intelligence (Al).109 Future advances in computer program-
ming and expert systems surely will aid our understanding of human lan-
guage and how it can be electronically "copied." 110 Computers today
106. See Kress, supra note 14, at 142.
107. See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LAN-
GUAGE (1982). Kripke posits that a "bizarre skeptic" might argue that past understandings of
algorithmic definitions cannot be objectively confirmed, even by recording former results. Id.
at 8. What we now consider to be addition, we might formerly have believed to be "quaddi-
tion," which is identical to addition, except for some pair of numbers which we did not actu-
ally compute, say 68 and 57, for which the result is five. Id. at 8-9. Since we did not actually
compute and record that particular sum in the past, the skeptic will argue there can be no
proof that our past self did not formerly use quaddition instead of addition at that time. If this
confusion can happen to a single mathematician, compared with his past self, it can happen
between two mathematicians as well. Fortunately, Kripke proposes at least one solution to
this skeptical problem. Id. at 107-09 (developing a variant of Ludwig Wittgenstein's "private
language argument").
108. Other limitations besides vagueness may exist. In Part III.B, infra, we conclude that
GdideI's Incompleteness Theorem applies to legal English and thus limits how legal English
can be used.
109. See Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model
of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1958-61 (1990); PENROSE, supra note 30, at 11-29;
HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS, supra note 44, at 492-525.
110. Roger Penrose raises this point:
can perform myriad tasks that just a few years ago could only be per-
formed by human beings. Software has been developed that allows ma-
chines to communicate with humans and assist in complex thought
projects. For instance, computers can play (and win at) chess,11' and
expert systems currently assist in "medical diagnoses, mathematics, me-
teorology, law, investment analysis, agriculture, and chemistry."' 12 No
doubt the years to come will witness even more "intelligent" programs
that can assist in other human endeavors.
One of the more intriguing developments in the field of artificial in-
telligence is a general recognition that in the coming years, with in-
creased storage space and greater processing speed, programs might be
developed that simulate human thought.1 3 Even more fascinating (and
disturbing to some) are the claims of a branch of Al research, called
"strong Al," which predicts that when computers can convincingly sim-
ulate human thought, they will have achieved consciousness. 1 4 They
will love and hate, experience pain and pleasure, just as humans do." 5
Also of interest commercially, as well as generally, is the development of expert sys-
tems, according to which the essential knowledge of an entire profession-medical,
legal, etc.-is intended to be coded into a computer package! Is it possible that the
experience and expertise of human members of these professions might actually be
supplanted by such packages?
PENROSE, supra note 30, at 11 (emphasis in original).
111. A program known as "Deep Thought" has gone so far as to defeat a Grandmaster.
PENROSE, supra note 30, at 13.
112. Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protections for Algo-
rithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1115 (1990)
(footnotes omitted). As for law, a computer program has been devised to assist lawyers with
specific tax problems. See, e.g., L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment
in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REv. 837, 838 (1977) ("iT]he
program ... is capable of performing a very rudimentary form of 'legal reasoning': Given a
'description' of the 'facts' of a corporate reorganization case, it can develop an 'analysis' of
these facts in terms of several legal 'concepts.' "); see also Rissland, supra note 109, at 1961-81
(discussing uses of AI in the law).
113. See PENROSE, supra note 30, at 17-18.
114. See id.; Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness,
and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659, 673-80 (1991) (discussing artificial intelligence and
the ability of machines to achieve consciousness).
115. The argument posits that the human brain is merely an organic microprocessor that
continually runs algorithms. See PENROSE, supra note 30, at 17 ("The idea [behind strong AL]
is that mental activity is simply the carrying out of some well-defined sequence of operations,
frequently referred to as an algorithm.") (emphasis in original). Human thought, and hence
consciousness, is achieved through these algorithms. All emotions are achieved algorithmi-
cally-albeit in an extremely complicated fashion. Id. Assuming electronic computers can
achieve this level of complexity, they too will achieve consciousness-they will "feel" just as
humans do. Id. at 14 ("[S]ome Al supporters envisage that concepts such as pain or happiness
can be appropriately modelled in this way.").
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To most people this proposition is absurd. How can machines think
and feel, love and hate? The proposition not only appears religiously
objectionable, but also belies common sense.116 Offering a reasoned ex-
planation for these intuitive feelings, however, is a different matter. In-
deed, explaining why machines cannot achieve consciousness is at least
as difficult as explaining why they can.
Roger Penrose, a renowned mathematician and physicist at Oxford,
offers a scientific rebuttal to strong AL. Penrose, in his book The Em-
peror's New Mind, explains that the universe itself is not determinate--or
at least not in a way that we can understand and assimilate.11 7 As exam-
ples, he cites to G6del's Incompleteness Theorem (discussed below)""
and quantum theory. With reference to the latter, Penrose observes that
the universe cannot be explained solely in terms of classical, determinate
physics. 1 9 Instead, certain microscopic parts of the universe interact in
a non-algorithmic fashion. 120
Penrose extrapolates from quantum theory and predicts that the
human mind also has a "non-algorithmic ingredient."1 21 Although "un-
conscious actions of the brain . . . proceed according to algorithmic
processes, the action of consciousness is quite different, and it proceeds in
a way that cannot be described by any algorithm."1 22 Furthermore,
'judgement-forming that ... is the hallmark of consciousness is itself
116. As Roger Penrose remarks,
Some readers may, from the start, have regarded the "strong-A supporter" as
perhaps largely a straw man! Is it not "obvious" that mere computation cannot
evoke pleasure or pain; that it cannot perceive poetry or the beauty of an evening sky
or the magic of sounds; that it cannot hope or love or despair; that it cannot have a
genuine autonomous purpose?
Id. at 447.
117. See id.
118. See infra Part III.B.2.
119. PENROSE, supra note 30, at 149-224.
120. See id. at 225-301. Of course, a detailed examination of quantum theory falls well
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that quantum theory involves the study of
molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. Id. at 149-50. Scientists have discovered that de-
terminate physical descriptions of these microscopic particles are impossible. Instead, their
movements and relationships with one another can only be described in terms of probabilities.
Id. Quantum theory is thus "a theory of uncertainty, indeterminism, and mystery." Id. at
149; see also D'Amato, Consequences of Plain Meaning, supra note 80, at 550-54 (discussing
quantum theory). It seems that "God does play dice," at least at a microscopic level. But cf
ABRAHAM PAIS, 'SUBTLE IS THE LORD... ': THE SCIENCE AND THE LIFE OF ALBERT
EINSTEIN 443 (1982) (quoting Einstein's letter to Max Born: "Quantum mechanics is very
impressive. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory produces a
good deal but hardly brings us closer to the secret of the Old One. I am at all events convinced
that He does not play dice.") (emphasis in original).
121. PENROSE, supra note 30, at 407 (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 411.
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something that the AI people would have no concept of how to program
on a computer."' 123
We are not currently able to forecast what implications Al might
hold for language and the law. Our guess is that should the strong AI
advocates be correct about human consciousness, a much better case can
be made for objectivity in human language. Given a strong Al vision of
the world, duplication of the human mind can be achieved because all
thought processes are algorithmic. In this world the brain's process for
assigning meaning to words would also be algorithmic. Rationality
would thus form the norm, and language would appear capable of pro-
jecting a core, objective meaning. If Penrose is correct, on the other
hand, then deducing meaning from words and phrases would likely
prove to be a non-algorithmic process. This would provide greater
credence to speculations about inherent subjectivity in language.
We do not purport to offer here any concrete answers to these deli-
cate linguistic questions. Instead, we only offer a tentative, intuitive ob-
servation that the case for linguistic vagueness seems overstated. We do
not doubt that language is vague, but we are circumspect over whether it
must be. At the least, we seriously question whether it must be vague in
a way that mathematics is not. Commentary to date has focused almost
entirely on the practical limitations of human language. Though this dis-
cussion has proved useful in deconstructing the notion that legal English
constrains judicial decisionmaking, it has yet to address convincingly
whether such linguistic constraints are inherently subjective and indeter-
minate. We will therefore proceed under the assumption that legal Eng-
lish can support a formally constructed system. We acknowledge,
however, that much work needs to be done to render our assumption a
reality.
B. Reaching for Formality Within the Law
Assuming legal English is objective enough to sustain formality, two
additional requirements must be met before the law can be considered
rigorously formal. First, self-evident truths must be established as legal
axioms, and second, procedural rules that guide legal reasoning must be
developed.124 In short, one must design a formal system implementing
the law. In the following sections, we will demonstrate that no such sys-
tem is possible, even under these assumptions. But for now, let us con-
sider what form such a system might take.
123. Id. at 412 (emphasis in original).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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We envision that a formal model of the law will presumably supply
precedent (whether statutory or common-law) for its axioms. Axioms so
expressed may not be self-evident, as are those of arithmetic, but would
be manifest in a positivistic sense. Legal logic would motivate the rules
for deriving new "theorems" from the precedent axiom set.1 25 We do not
deny the possibility of other models, and our subsequent analysis does
not require this approach. However, models that diverge substantially
from that which we envision here might well be too different to serve as
practical models of "the law" that society is willing to accept.
For example, consider Professor Joseph Singer's proposal of a for-
mal system consisting of just one rule: All plaintiffs lose.126 This system,
which we shall call P-Loses, appears complete, for it provides a solution
for every legal dispute, 127 and consistent, because in no case will it permit
a court to deduce both that one party must prevail and then again that
this same party must lose. Although this system has been characterized
as a "legal system" by some scholars,1 28 we do not view it as apractical
formal model of the law for two reasons.
First, although it provides a single, ostensibly determinate solution
for any litigation, P-Loses fails to incorporate even the simplest of com-
mon-law rules and logic.129 It instead uses a single, simple, and brutish
rule to achieve its results. In this way, it resembles an analogous system
found in mathematics: the elementary logic of propositions, also known
as the calculus of tautologies.1 30 This system can also be proved consis-
125. See, eg., Sinclair, supra note 24, at 363 n.33. Our reference to "legal logic" here is a
reference to deductive legal reasoning, as opposed to inductive or analogical legal reasoning.
Only deductive reasoning, which proceeds from general rules to specific conclusions, has the
power to produce formal results. See Wellman, supra note 89, at 64-87. "Unlike deductive
arguments, inductive arguments do not necessitate their conclusions." Id. at 86. Rather, rea-
soning by analogy is "probabilistic." Id at 92. Professor Wellman argues in favor of a third
form of legal reasoning: "practical reasoning." Id. at 88. He admits, however, that this form
of reasoning is not determinate, and we will therefore not consider it here.
126. Singer, supra note 6, at 11.
127. But see infra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
128. See, eg., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283, 286 (1989)
("Although complete determinacy is attainable in a legal system (Singer considers the rule:
The plaintiff always loses), any completely determinate system would fail to be 'just or legiti-
mate' because it would insufficiently protect 'security, privacy, reputation, freedom of move-
ment,' and other competing values.") (citing Singer, supra note 6, at 11).
129. By its own terms, any rule of law providing a remedy under some circumstances is
imperfectly approximated by P-Loses for any case where those circumstances obtain. For any
case where a plaintiff might win damages under the common law-for example, a non-consen-
sual and unprovoked battery-P-Loses derives an "invalid" result.
130. A tautology is a statement that excludes no logical possibilities. ERNST NAGEL &
JAMES R. NEWMAN, G6DEL'S PROoF 52 (1958). An example is any statement of the form "P
or not P." This statement is necessarily true, no matter how the non-logical variable is inter-
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tent in an absolute sense, even when the non-logical symbols are arithme-
tic formulae.131 However, the calculus of tautologies only admits as
theorems those propositions of arithmetic that are trivially true, that is,
those that are true regardless of the validity of the underlying arithmeti-
cal propositions.1 32 It is thus a severely limited system that can only
derive true propositions of arithmetic that are also tautological.
Only in the most picayune sense can the calculus of tautologies be
considered a formal model of arithmetic. True, its theorems are all cor-
rect propositions about the objects of arithmetic, and the system cannot
produce a contradiction. But the calculus of tautologies is of limited
value to people who want to uncover even the most elementary truths
about numbers.
For like reasons, P-Loses models the law in only the most trivial
sense imaginable. It offers nothing to help resolve societal disputes-a
fact recognized by scholars on both sides of the formalism debate.133 A
practical formal model of the law must have the strength to provide use-
ful answers. This is the reason one aspires to formality in the first place.
Second, even assuming that a tautological system can be formally
useful, P-Loses still fails as a counter-example. A close examination of P-
Loses suggests that it is not even a tautological system. P-Loses is com-
plete only if one assumes there can be no dispute over who or what is a
"plaintiff." Does "plaintiff" include those who make counterclaims?13 4
What about third-party claims? 135 Are those who are involuntarily
joined plaintiffs?1 36 Answering these questions requires additional rules
and a formal methodology. Hence, it appears that P-Loses may be re-
lieved of its tautological character after all, and may be transformed into
a more interesting (and powerful) system. As established below, it is the
very power of an "interesting" system that necessitates incompleteness or
inconsistency. 137
preted. Thus, in arithmetic, the tautology "1 + 1 = 2 or not I + 1 = 2" is true, regardless of
the interpretation of the arithmetic symbols "1," "2," "+," and "=". This is not the case for
the simple non-tautology "1 + 1 = 2." Id. at 52-54.
131. Id. at 45-56.
132. Hofstadter offers additional examples of limited formal systems that involve opera-
tions of arithmetic but are complete and consistent. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra
note 26, at 406-07.
133. See, e.g., D'Amato, One Bold Thought, supra note 72, at 113-14 ("I would contend
that such a 'system' is not and cannot possibly be a 'legal system.' "); Kress, supra note 14, at
286; Singer, supra note 6, at 11.
134. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (compulsory and permissive counterclaims).
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (third-party practice).
136. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (joinder of persons needed for just adjudication).
137. See infra notes 148-158 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
August 1992] LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND METAMATHEMATICS 1465
Assuming that our imagined legal system is formally constructed
and determinate, it must mechanically resolve all cases that arise under
its terms. For any dispute, whatever the facts, the law will render an
outcome without needing human assistance. This outcome would consti-
tute a proposition of the legal system, and would look something like
this: "Given facts A, B, C, . . ., propositions q, r, s, . . ., therefore P. "138
Of course, because an infinity of facts (and hence possible cases) exist, the
number of derivable legal propositions is unbounded. The law is thus
ideal, not only for the reasons mentioned above, but also because it al-
lows a finite, manageable collection of rules to direct all of society's af-
fairs and incursions.
Were the law truly formal and determinate, a computer could, in
theory, 139 be programmed to apply it.14° Indeed, this computer would
act as the law in every way, with its only limitation being an inability to
develop facts. 141 Facts would instead have to be determined by some
human decisionmaker and then fed into the program. Once this factual
data is input into the program, however, the program would algorithmi-
cally apply the proper rules and render the correct result. Such a pro-
gram may not be exactly what mainstream legal scholars have in
mind,142 but it must follow from a true appraisal of formalism. The de-
138. P represents any legal conclusion, including an intermediate conclusion of law, such
as "a valid contract was formed," or an ultimate resolution of the case, such as "the plaintiff
wins."
139. Consider the following outline of such a program. It is a simple matter to generate all
possible strings of text that can be produced, given an alphabet: first all strings one character
in length, then longer strings, and so forth. Since the law, by hypothesis, is formal, we can
algorithmically verify whether or not each string constitutes a dispositive proof of any given
legal matter; for in a formal system, the validity of a string is determined algorithmically from
the string's syntax alone. The program continues this process of generating the next string and
verifying whether it is the dispositive argument for one or the other side. When one is found, it
halts.
Since the law is determinate, hence complete, there must exist a legal argument to resolve
the matter. Thus, the program must halt eventually. Because the law is consistent, once we
find such an argument, we are secure that no dispositive argument to the contrary exists.
Thus, the result of the program determinately resolves the matter. See generally PENROSE,
supra note 30, at 116-18.
Although a program that would determine legal disputes must theoretically exist, given
these assumptions, the algorithm need not necessarily be efficient or practical. The number of
possible strings, even those of moderate size, is intractably large. For example, the class of all
possible text strings of length 40 from an alphabet of only ten characters numbers 10 .
Processing all such strings at the rate of one thousand per second would take more than three
octillion (3 X 1027) centuries.
140. See generally D'Amato, Computers, supra note 89; PENROSE, supra note 30, at 99-
148.
141. See D'Amato, Computers, supra note 89, at 1279-80.
142. See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 536-39 (complaining that formalism's
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rivative question of legal formalism, then, is whether a program of this
nature, at least in theory, exists. We intend in the succeeding sections to
show that it does not.
1. Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem
David Hilbert, a famous German mathematician, posed an identical
question-called the Entscheidungsproblem-about mathematics in
1900.143 Hilbert was so impressed with the power of mathematics that
he believed all of mathematics must somehow be related, and that a gen-
eral, formal decision process could be found that would solve all mathe-
matical questions.144 Hilbert challenged mathematicians to develop such
a system, or to prove that it did not exist. He sought no less than to
insulate mathematics from human judgment and intuition. Once a gen-
eral decision system was discovered, all insight would cease.1 45 Problems
would be input into the system and algorithmically solved without fur-
ther human thought.
Hilbert's proposal, of course, predated the age of electronic com-
puters. Cast in modem terms, Hilbert was seeking something analogous
to the computer program described above. 146 Following the initial input,
the program would solve the problem without asking further questions of
the programmer. It would not give the programmer a "menu" to choose
from, nor would it ask the programmer to select a specific routine. It
would ask nothing at all. It would simply run until it solved the
problem.
2. Gddel's Incompleteness Theorem
Fortunately for mathematicians (lest they be out of work), Kurt
Gbdel proved in 1931 that Hilbert's proposed formal system does not
exist.' 47 Specifically, G6del demonstrated that formal systems powerful
enough to express the axioms and propositions of arithmetic cannot be
closed and rigorous nature acts as an impediment to "optimally sensitive decisionmaking"); see
also D'Amato, Computers, supra note 89, at 1298-1301 (evaluating the costs of a formal legal
system).
143. PENROSE, supra note 30, at 34.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 110-12.
146. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
147. See PENROSE, supra note 30, at 105. Of special note is Penrose's remark:
The point of view that one can dispense with the meaning of mathematical state-
ments, regarding them as nothing but strings of symbols in some formal mathemati-
cal system, is the mathematical standpoint of formalism. Some people like this idea,
whereby mathematics becomes a kind of "meaningless game." It is not an idea that
appeals to me, however. It is indeed "meaning"--not blind algorithmic computa-
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both complete and consistent. 148 Instead, these systems must contain
either statements that are neither provable nor disprovable within the
system, or at least two inconsistent statements that are both provable
within the system. 149 In either case, proof or disproof of these statements
can only be accomplished with extra-systemic insight.
Gidel's proof was complex, delicate, and closely tied to the specific
formal system he considered.150 Briefly, it followed from recognizing
that an arithmetical proposition, G, can be properly constructed within
arithmetic, where G has the following meaning:
tion-that gives mathematics its substance. Fortunately, Gildel dealt formalism a
devastating blow!"
Id. (emphasis in original).
148. Kurt G&lel, UJber formal unentscheidbare Sdtze der Principia Mathematica und ver-
wandter Systeme I [On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Re-
lated Systems 1], 38 MONATSHEFTE FOR MATHEMATIK UND PHYSIK 173 (1931), reprinted in
FROM FREGE TO G6DEL: A SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, 1879-1931, at 596
(Jean van Heijenoort ed. & trans., 1967) [hereinafter G~del, On Formally Undecidable Proposi-
tions]. Specifically, Gbdel's paper proved the incompleteness or inconsistency of the formal
system described in ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA
MATHEMATICA (1910-1913).
149. As Penrose elaborates:
What Gidel showed was that any such precise ("formal") mathematical system of
axioms and rules of procedure whatever, provided that it is broad enough to contain
descriptions of simple arithmetical propositions... and provided that it is free from
contradiction, must contain some statements which are neither provable nor disprov-
able by the means allowed within the system.
PENROSE, supra note 30, at 102 (emphasis in original).
150. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 204 ("Gidel's construction depends
on describing the form, as well as the content, of strings of the formal system ...."). The
proof structured by Gddel was thus a purely technical consequence of the structure of formal
systems and the assumption that a particular system can express truths about arithmetic. See
Gbdel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions, supra note 148, at 596-616. Gbdel suggested
that similar results could be obtained for other formal systems that satisfied related technical
considerations. Id. at 598.
Raymond Smullyan, Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University, has considered set-
tings other than arithmetic for which Gi~del-like results might hold. See RAYMOND SMUL-
LYAN, WHAT IS THE NAME OF THIS BOOK? 225-26, 234 (1978) (considering under what
conditions Gddel-like results apply for an island of truth-telling knights and lie-telling knaves
in determining to which club each member belongs); RAYMOND SMULLYAN, FOREVER UNDE-
CIDED (1987) [hereinafter SMULLYAN, FOREVER UNDECIDED] (describing G~idel-like results
for certain modal belief systems-systems that permit statements of the form "X believes P,"
where X is some person and P is any statement of the modal belief system). While more
general in approach than G6del's work, which applied only to one formal system, Smullyan's
systems require certain self-referential properties that are not obviously true of the law. See id.
at 173-86. His results apparently have been misconstrued by some authors, who adopted
Smullyan's conclusions without noting these self-referential assumptions. See, e.g., Anthony
D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513,
521 n.28 (1989) (citing SMULLYAN, FOREVER UNDECIDED, supra, for the proposition that
"[w]hat is true of mathematical formulae is a fortiori true of words").
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The arithmetical proposition G has no proof within the system of
arithmetic.
G6del demonstrated that this particular proposition is in fact true, and
therefore cannot be proved under the axioms and rules of arithmetic,
unless arithmetic is itself inconsistent.1 51
In simple logic, Gbdel's proof proceeds this way: Ask the question
whether G has a proof within arithmetic. If it does, then what it asserts
about arithmetic must be true. But what G asserts about arithmetic is
that G has no proof. Therefore, there is no proof of G in arithmetic,
contradicting the original assumption that a proof for G exists. Con-
versely, inquire whether there is a proof of the negation of G, -- G, within
arithmetic. If such a proof exists, then what it asserts about the system
would also be true of arithmetic, that -G has a proof within arithmetic.
Consequently, from the assumption that G has a proof, we derive a proof
for G and must therefore conclude that arithmetic is inconsistent. Thus,
arithmetic either has a proposition which can be neither proved nor dis-
proved, or it is inconsistent.
Gdel's proof demonstrated that Hilbert's program was doomed to
failure. Absent extra-systemic insights, such as thought or intuition, no
mechanical system can derive all true propositions of arithmetic. From
this, mathematicians recognized that to perform higher mathematics,
some "informal" metamathematical reasoning is necessary. A computer
program may assist mathematicians, but cannot supplant them.
Although useful for guiding and validating mathematical work, design-
edly formal systems such as arithmetic are by their very nature doomed to
play a secondary role in the search for truth.15 2
3. The Limits of G'del's Proof
The true genius of G5del's proof lies not so much in its results as in
G6del's manner of constructing the proposition G. Propositions of for-
mal systems do not naturally have meanings; they are merely abstract
objects, strings of the formal syntax of a system's language.15 3 Further-
more, to the extent meaning is attached to propositions, those proposi-
151. GiSdel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions, supra note 148, at 597-99; HoF-
STADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 17-19; PENROSE, supra note 30, at 106-08.
152. See PENROSE, supra note 30, at 112 ("[Formal] systems indeed have very valuable
roles to play in mathematical discussions, but they can supply only a partial (or approximate)
guide to truth. Real mathematical truth goes beyond mere man-made constructions.").
153. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 35. However, meanings develop
from the form of the formal system itself. By finding relationships between the form of the
theorems of a formal system and some other entity, these relationships, or mapping, induce a
meaning onto the strings. Id. at 51. For an example, see infra notes 155-158 and accompany-
ing text.
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tions generally "speak" only in terms of the subject of the formal system
and not about the formal system itself. For example, arithmetical pro-
positions naturally "speak" of the properties of numbers, but say nothing
about arithmetic itself.154 Hence, it seems that the string G could not
really express the meaning Gbidel attributed to it.
At least, not at first glance. G5del observed that based upon the
syntax of the strings of the formal arithmetical system, a number could
be assigned to each proposition.1 55 He demonstrated that any proposi-
tion-or more accurately, any metaproposition about propositions of
arithmetic-can be expressed as a statement about numbers, and hence
as a statement within arithmetic. 156 This process of associating, or "map-
ping," strings within a system with propositions about the system is
known as "embedding."' 157 It is this technique, coupled with G~idel's in-
tricate numbering scheme, that allowed G6del to ultimately demonstrate
the true existence of his G proposition.' 58
Gfdel's proof consequently finds itself closely associated and inter-
twined with arithmetic. Related systems may be proved to suffer arith-
metic's fate, but only after they are either seen to contain arithmetic or
somehow correspond with arithmetic such that they can be used to prove
arithmetical propositions. 59 Absent an explicit construction of this type,
Giidel's result does not assist the discussion regarding a system's inherent
indeterminacy.
When mathematical systems are at issue, this observation about the
scope of G6del's Theorem has proved unimportant. After extensive re-
search and analysis, all proposed mathematical systems were found to be
154. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 204-28.
155. A "G6del number" is assigned to each character in the alphabet of arithmetic. See,
e.g., Gbdel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions, supra note 148, at 601 (coding the numeral
"0" as the number 1; the symbol for negation "-" as 5; the symbol for dijunction "v" as 7;
and etc.); see also HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 268; NAGEL & NEWMAN,
supra note 130, at 68-76. The G6del number for a string of characters is a function of the
Gidel numbers of its constituent characters, contrived so that the G6del number for each
string is unique, and so that the G6del number of its substrings is given by an arithmetical
function of the string itself.
156. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 130, at 76-84. Essentially, he showed that there was
a correspondence between statements about propositions (metapropositions) and statements
about the corresponding Gddel numbers for those propositions, such that the metaproposition
was true about propositions of arithmetic if, and only if, the corresponding proposition within
arithmetic was true of numbers. This process was called the "arithmetization" of
metamathematics. Id.
157. HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 97.
158. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 130, at 85-97. See supra note 155 and accompanying
text.
159. See infra Part III.B.4.
sufficiently equivalent to arithmetic that G6del's Theorem could be ap-
plied. Mathematicians since then have simply assumed that all new for-
malizations would fall subject to the same analysis. 160 Consequently,
general statements about Gbdel's Theorem prove correct when spealdng
about mathematics, though even these are to some extent mere
conjecture.
Whether the law bears some correlation to arithmetic such that
G6del's Theorem can be applied is a difficult question. Some have relied
on intuition and assumed that it does. They argue that if Gibdel's Theo-
rem is true of a limited, rigorous system such as arithmetic, a fortiori it
must also be true of a richer, more amorphous system such as the law. 161
Others, however, are more skeptical. 162 Professor Randall Kelso,
for example, has argued that the correspondence between statements
within arithmetic and statements about arithmetic found in Gbdel's
proof simply cannot exist with respect to questions of nature, or conse-
quently of the law. 163 Although this argument identifies the difficulty in
finding such a correspondence, 164 it fails to demonstrate that such map-
ping is impossible. 165 Moreover, the assumption underlying this posi-
160. This assumption, although well founded on the experience of mathematical logicians,
has never been proved:
The possibility of constructing a finitistic absolute proof of consistency for arithmetic
is not excluded by G6del's results. Gddel showed that no such proof is possible that
can be represented within arithmetic. His argument does not eliminate the possibil-
ity of strictly finitistic proofs that cannot be represented within arithmetic. But no
one today appears to have a clear idea of what a finitistic proof would be like that is
not capable of formulation within arithmetic.
NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 130, at 98 n.31 (emphasis in original).
161. See, e.g., D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 598 n.96; D'Amato,
Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 176 n.91; Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier, The Com-
pleat Wrangler, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1001, 1002 (1966); Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier, Logic and
Law: The Precedence of Precedents, 51 MINN. L. REv. 655, 664 (1967) (assuming Gi~del ap-
plies to the common law, thus rendering the common law incomplete); see also KORNSTEIN,
supra note 61, at 127 ("The implications of G del's Theorem for any theory of the law have
been ignored for too long. .. ").
162. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 24, at 363 n.33 (1987) (challenging Stone-de Montpen-
sier for not explaining "why we should think Gbdel's theorem relevant to [the common-law]
system.").
163. Kelso, supra note 9, at 830-32.
164. Id. at 832. Kelso observed that there must be a special correspondence between the
system and metasystemic propositions, as there was in G~del's theorem, as well as mere poten-
tial for self-reference. He suggested that the existence of such a correspondence in a model of
natural law does not follow from GiSdel's theorem alone. Id.
165. See id. at 832-35 ("Once reality is assumed to exist ... Gddel's theorem places no
limits on the ability of a system of legal rules or principles to be complete and consistent.").
Kelso fails to make any substantive argument why the correspondence between the legal and
the metalegal cannot be made. In particular, although he observes correctly the use and men-
tion errors arising out of self-reference in the Epimenides paradox, id. at 829-39; see also infra
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tion-hinging on whether reality is illusory-cannot be seriously
considered. In any event, G6del's Theorem can hardly be dismissed as
having no application to the "real world."
Professor Ken Kress presents a more modest suggestion. Rather
than challenging the meaning of Gbdel's Theorem, he questions whether
it has any application to the law. Specifically, Professor Kress argues
that certain rigorous mathematical proofs are inapplicable to the English
language. These proofs, Kress argues, "will not 'go through' in legal
English."'' 66 He states: "'Words,' English, and legal language are insuf-
ficiently precise for the assertions and inferences of a formal proof.., to
be true and valid about them."' 167 Although Professor Kress does not
make this charge in specific reference to G6del's Incompleteness Theo-
rem, his objection is broad enough to encompass the issue of that theo-
rem's applicability to the law.1 68
Part III.B.5 (discussion of Epimenides paradox), he seems unaware of Professor W.V. Quine's
restatement of the paradox that avoids this error, see infra text accompanying notes 177-178,
even though Quine's work appears prominently throughout the book reviewed. See, eg., HOF-
STADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 431-37, 445, 446, 449, 497-99, 531, 698-99.
Thus, Kelso's arguments merely beg the question whether G6del's Theorem can apply to the
law. While Kelso claims that Gidel's Theorem is meaningless, given "the assumption of real-
ity," see Kelso, supra note 9, at 832-34, other mathematicians and philosophers disagree.
Israel Kleiner, Rigor and Proof in Mathematics: A Historical Perspective, 64 MATHEMATICS
MAG. 291, 307 (1991) ("Gbdel's results are of fundamental philosophical consequence .... );
see S.G. Shanker, Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Significance of Gl'del's Theorem, in GODEL'S
THEOREM IN Focus, supra note 23, at 155, 241-42. Roger Penrose, for example, envisions
G6del's Theorem as an awakening of true consciousness:
Mathematical truth is not something that we ascertain merely by use of an algorithm.
I believe, also, that our consciousness is a crucial ingredient in our comprehension of
mathematical truth. We must "see" the truth of a mathematical argument to be
convinced of its validity. This "seeing" is the very essence of consciousness. It must
be present whenever we directly perceive mathematical truth. When we convince
ourselves of the validity of G&lel's theorem we not only "see" it, but by so doing we
reveal the very non-algorithmic nature of the "seeing" process itself.
PENROSE, supra note 30, at 418 (emphases in original).
166. Kress, supra note 14, at 144.
167. Id. Professor Kress makes this assertion specifically about the LdIwenheim-Skolem
theorems. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
168. Professor D'Amato (whose article Kress was challenging in the latter's assertion
about mathematical proofs) assumed in a later rebuttal that Kress was in fact speaking to
Gddel's Theorem. D'Amato replied:
Although Professor Kress is technically correct in saying that Lowenheim-Skolem
(as well as Godel-Church) were designed to apply to formal systems, my position is
that either they apply a fortiori to non-formal systems such as law, or if they don't
apply because law is a non-formal system, then for that reason the Indeterminacy
thesis is proven.
D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 176 n.92.
Professor D'Amato's apparent horns-of-a-dilemma arguments neglect the possibility that
there might be deterministic methods other than those which use formal systems. In mathe-
Given the delicacy of Gb5del's proof, Professor Kress's suggestion
that it may not "go through" in legal English is certainly credible.169
Legal English could prove objective enough to sustain a formal structure
while avoiding altogether the limiting implications of Gi5del's Theorem.
On the other hand, the expressiveness of arithmetic-not its limita-
tions-allowed Gibdel to demonstrate its indeterminacy. Because legal
English is more expressive than arithmetic, the intuitive argument that
G6del's results must apply equally to the law has a certain appeal.
Though intuition is by no means a convincing proof,170 it prompts us to
explore whether one exists.' 71
4. Applying G6*del's Theorem to the Law
We envision four methods for demonstrating the application of
Gidel's Theorem to legal English. First, a direct proof along the lines of
G6del's original proof might be constructed. Given, however, the com-
plexity of Gidel's proof and the density of any formal model of the law,
matics, for example, it is demonstrable that there is no algorithm to determine whether a given
computer program will halt. PENROSE, supra note 30, at 57-65 (proving Turing's halting theo-
rem). Nevertheless, it is certain that all computer programs will either halt eventually, or they
will not. Thus, despite the absence of a formal means to determine the result, it may be mean-
ingful to say that a determinate answer exists. These questions raised by the Kress-D'Amato
debate are analogous to the debate between mathematical platonists and mathematical intui-
tionists. Mathematical intuitionists refuse to accept as true all statements of the form "P or
not P," since for some statements, such as the G6del proposition "G," neither G nor its nega-
tion can be proved. Platonists hold that even if G can be neither proved nor disproved, the
proposition "G or not G" is necessarily true. Id. at 112-16.
169. See supra text at note 166. Still, the manner in which Professor Kress phrases his
objection is troubling. He protests the use of mathematical principles because legal language is
"imprecise." Kress, supra note 14, at 144. As Professor D'Amato explains in response to
Professor Kress: "If English is not precise, then Formalism is out the window and we don't
need Godel ... ; only Indeterminacy remains." D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra
note 9, at 172 n.78.
170. Douglas Hofstadter has warned against rote extension of Gbdel's Theorem to other
disciplines:
If one uses Gbdel's Theorem as a metaphor, as a source of inspiration, rather
than trying to translate it literally into the language of... any other discipline, then
perhaps it can suggest new truths in ... other areas. But it is quite unjustifiable to
translate it directly into a statement of another discipline and take that as equally
valid.
HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 696.
171. Compare the comments of Roger Penrose:
If we can see that the role of consciousness is non-algorithmic when forming mathe-
matical judgements, where calculation and rigorous proof constitute such an impor-
tant factor, then surely we may be persuaded that such a non-algorithmic ingredient
could be crucial also for the role of consciousness in more general (non-mathemati-
cal) circumstances.
PENROSE, supra note 30, at 416 (emphasis in original).
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such an approach appears intractable. Arithmetic is a very simple sys-
tem, and G6del's work in that context was an astounding feat. A similar
proof using a more complex system such as the law would require a her-
culean effort. 172
Second, arithmetic might be directly embedded within the law. This
would entail showing that propositions of arithmetic can properly be
proved using legal reasoning in such a fashion that a given proposition of
arithmetic is a theorem of arithmetic if, and only if, it can be proved
under the law. If this were done, the law would necessarily contain at
least one indeterminate proposition. Were this somehow possible, the
indeterminacy of propositions within the law would follow directly from
Gbdel's Theorem, since all theorems of arithmetic would also be disposi-
tive propositions of law.
Third, arithmetic might be indirectly embedded within the law. In-
stead of directly expressing arithmetical propositions as legal proposi-
tions, a correspondence might be found between arithmetical
propositions and hypothetical cases within the law. The correspondence
could be designed, for example, so that if a proposition of arithmetic cor-
responds to a given hypothetical, then the proposition is a theorem if,
and only if, the hypothetical must be determinately decided for the plain-
tiff. Because Gbdel's proof demonstrates that there are true arithmetical
propositions which cannot be proved, all of their corresponding hypo-
thetical cases will be indeterminate. 173 The case, because of the al-
gorithm's construction, would be decidable only if the corresponding
arithmetical proposition is provable in arithmetic. As in the second ap-
proach, the indeterminacy of arithmetic would then prove a general inde-
terminacy in the law. Not all propositions about arithmetic can be
proven within arithmetic; hence, certain cases would not be determinate
either.
172. Gbdel proved his theorem for the simple formalization described in Principia
Mathematica, see Gildel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions, supra note 148, which used
but a dozen symbols and about that many proof rules, see WHITEHEAD & RUSSELL, supra note
148. Any hypothetical axiomatization of the law will likely be substantially more complex,
even in skeletal form. See, eg., Sinclair, supra note 24 (sketching a formal system of law).
173. Assume the converse is true-that is, the law is determinate. If this is so and one
could show that all theorems of arithmetic are provable within the law, then the law could be
used to construct a general decision procedure (a Hilbert program) for arithmetic. Because the
law is assumedly determinate, a general decision procedure exists for determining the outcome
of any hypothetical. Resolution of certain cases would prove that certain arithmetical proposi-
tions are provable in arithmetic. Indeed, all propositions of arithmetic could be proved in this
way. But we know this is not possible because of G6del's theorem. Therefore, the assumption
that the law is determinate must be false.
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Proofs such as these are certainly possible, but hardly obvious. The
tediousness and complexity of the first approach, even if it could be ac-
complished, would prove overbearing. The second and third models,
meanwhile, require a very clever construction of a correspondence be-
tween legal English and arithmetic. Developing such a construction
would, to say the least, be an imaginative task.
Furthermore, before such a proof could even be attempted, one
would need to begin with a working formal model of the law-a task that
has eluded scholars to date. Each of the first three approaches derives its
result from the actual form and structure of a proposed system. Without
an exemplar of a legal system, no direct proof using these techniques is
possible. Even if one were able to. provide a rough outline of such a
model-one powerful enough to facilitate a direct proof-no assurance
would exist that this same proof could be applied to any other hypotheti-
cal model of the law. Although Gi5del's proof has been confidently ex-
tended to other models of arithmetic and many branches of mathematics,
a similar extension to diverse models of the law is not so certain. Direct
G6del-like proofs might therefore be frustrating in their inability to sin-
gularly resolve the debate.
A fourth approach to the problem, that which we take here, is to
demonstrate Gbdel's applicability to the law by constructing an indeter-
minate legal proposition within a specific legal context. Though short of
a full-fledged proof, this microcosmic approach, we believe, leads to the
same conclusions established by a direct, technical demonstration. Our
methodology dispenses with Gdel's brilliant (and intricate) embedding
technique and the necessity of developing an express exemplar of the
law. 174 We instead opt for a simple-though by no means obvious-
illustration. This illustration proceeds along lines similar to the famous
Epimenides Paradox.
5. Epimenides and the Law
Linguistic paradoxes premised on the presumption that the truth of
a statement depends upon its textual representation date back to ancient
times.1 75 A statement such as "This statement is false" creates a paradox
174. Because this approach does not derive its results from the details of the form and
structure of a system, we do not require a functional model of the law. Instead, we merely
assume two properties of the system's behavior: (1) that it "properly" applies one specific rule
of law in all cases for which that rule is applicable (duties under a valid contract are enforcea-
ble when all conditions precedent are satisfied); and (2) that it does not require a judge to hold
true any logical proposition that can be demonstrated false under a given formal system of
logic.
175. For instance, the famous Epimenides paradox involved Epimenides, a Cretan, who
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when its own truth is questioned. One would assume that either "This
statement is false" is true, or "This statement is false" is false. The para-
dox exists because assuming either of these to be correct admits a line of
reasoning proving the validity of the other. The result is an antinomy.
Although the propositions are negations of each other, they are both
either true or false.
The difficulty in this paradox can be resolved by inquiring as to what
exactly the "This" in "This statement is false" refers. Ultimately, one
will find that the paradox arises from taking "This" to mean both the
sentence-the syntactic object "This statement is false"-and the propo-
sition-the logical object to which the sentence refers. When the two
meanings are bifurcated, one need not abandon a usual understanding of
the truth predicate. Instead, one need only abandon the idea that a logi-
cal proposition must identify with the sentence that expresses it. Once
this is done, the sentence "This statement is false" empties itself of any
real content. 176
Paradox, however, cannot be so readily disposed of in natural lan-
guage. Owing to a clever construction by Professor W.V. Quine, the par-
adox of a textually-based truth predicate can be renewed in a meaningful
way. Professor Quine restated "This statement is false" as:
"Yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation" yields a
falsehood when appended to its own quotation. 177
Quine's restatement avoids ambiguous words such as "This," but still
accomplishes the self-reference necessary to achieve an antinomy.
To understand why this is so, consider the following statement:
(I) "Contains ten words" yields a falsehood when appended to its own
quotation.
The truth of this statement depends on whether the phrase in quotes,
"Contains ten words," when appended to an unquoted version of itself,
produces a sentence referring to a logically true proposition. The propo-
sition that results from the operation prescribed by (I) is this:
(II) "Contains ten words" contains ten words.
Because the quoted phrase "Contains ten words" actually contains only
three words, the proposition asserted by sentence (II) is false, and the
stated: "All Cretans are liars." On the assumption that to be a liar means that every statement
is false, Epimenides' proposition is a paradoxical self-reference. See Kelso, supra note 9, at
828-30.
176. See HOFSTADTER, GOLDEN BRAID, supra note 26, at 495-99; Kelso, supra note 9, at
828.
177. W.V. QUINE, PURSUIT OF TRUTH 82 (1990).
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proposition asserted in (I) is true. Note, however, that if the quoted
phrase read "Contains three words," then the resulting statement,
"Contains three words" contains three words
would be true. The corresponding variant of sentence (I) would there-
fore be false.
Return to Quine's restatement of "This statement is false." If the
syntactic operation demanded in that statement is performed, the result
is:
"Yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation" yields a
falsehood when appended to its own quotation.
But this sentence is textually identical to Quine's original restatement.
Thus, when one queries whether the proposition represented by Quine's
restatement is true, a vicious self-reference is created that is no less para-
doxical than "This statement is false." Quine succeeds in recreating the
paradox found in "This statement is false," but without the confusion
over use and mention found with the word "This."
Quine's construction, together with the assumption that some predi-
cate exists for determining the validity of a sentence's meaning, creates
an antinomy. The culprit, of course, is the assumption that a general
truth predicate exists. In particular, the notion that a predicate can de-
termine the truth of any proposition solely from a textual representation
of it within the language itself is incoherent. The truth predicate, so de-
fined, is indeterminate. As a practical matter, the antinomy can be re-
solved by restricting the scope of the predicate's use.178 Nevertheless,
this restriction does not solve the indeterminacy; it merely shifts the na-
ture of the indeterminacy from inconsistency to incompleteness.
From Quine's antinomy one begins to see that English suffers
problems of self-reference quite similar to those arising from G6del's
numberings of arithmetic. Indeed, the similarity between the two is ap-
parent even without a construction relating arithmetic to legal English.
This revelation leads us to consider the possibility that a legal case can be
assembled which, with respect to legal determinism, is analogous to
Quine's version of the Epimenides Paradox. 179 Such a case would prove
178. Id. at 82-84.
179. Since inherent indeterminacies are somewhat counterintuitive, there is a natural ten-
dency to reject them-particularly at first. This makes it somewhat unfair (as well as incor-
rect) to casually assert that indeterminacies in one instance a fortiori imply another.
Not only lawyers but most people harbor superstitions about the nature of language
and meaning. These superstitions assume that meanings reside "in" language some-
what the way furniture resides in rooms-securely "there" where the interpreter can
see, identify, and grasp them the way we can see, identify, and grasp tables and
chairs.
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that indeterminacy is inherent in the law on a level analogous to, if not
exactly equal to, that found in arithmetic.180
6. An Inherently Indeterminate Proposition of Law
Consider the following scenario: Professor Langdelle (a very for-
malistic professor of law) contracts with one of his Critical students,
Kurt Gurdelle, to resolve the question of indeterminacy in the law. The
contractual terms are as follows: Langdelle promises to pay Gurdelle
one hundred dollars when Gurdelle produces a hypothetical case con-
taining a legal proposition for which the law does not uniquely compel an
outcome. Gurdelle accepts the terms of Langdelle's offer and busily goes
about constructing such an indeterminate case.
Now assume that Gurdelle, believing he has found such a case, de-
livers a textual description of it to Langdelle and asks for the one hun-
dred dollars. Langdelle, thinking the proof preposterous, refuses to pay.
Of course, Gurdelle has a potential action on a contract against
Langdelle. The crucial question is whether Gurdelle has performed
under the terms of the agreement, a question that can only be answered
by directly inquiring whether Gurdelle's proposed case is indeterminate.
Specifically, the question is whether the law compels a unique outcome
for the hypothetical situation proposed by Gurdelle.
With this in mind, we need to focus on Gurdelle's hypothetical.
Gurdelle realizes that he can succeed in creating an indeterminate fact
pattern if he can somehow generate an antinomy like that achieved by
Quine. To do so, he observes that he must somehow make his hypotheti-
cal refer back to itself. In this way, the hypothetical will take on the
character of Quine's restatement of "This statement is false"-thereby
becoming indeterminate.
To achieve this result, Gurdelle develops the following situation:
He assumes a hypothetical, formalistic law professor contracts with a
hypothetical student to prove indeterminacy in the law. The professor
promises to pay the student one hundred dollars if the student can
Gerald Graff, Keep off the Grass, Drop Dead, and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to San-
ford Levinson, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 175,
175 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). Ultimately, the validity of an argument
that indeterminacies exist can be found in the pudding, by direct proof or example.
180. The petard upon which G6del ultimately hoisted arithmetic was the ingenious coding
of assertions about arithmetic as assertions about numbers. See supra notes 155-158 and ac-
companying text. Here, Quine's result suggests that we may be able to demonstrate, using his
technique, the impossibility of a language-based predicate that derives the truth of certain legal
propositions. The only difficulty in such an approach is to avoid confusing the use and men-
tion of a legal proposition.
demonstrate an indeterminate case containing a legal proposition that
cannot be resolved under the law. The student busily goes about con-
structing the example and then presents it to the professor. The profes-
sor rejects the proof as preposterous and refuses to pay.
Gurdelle styles his not-so-hypothetical case Critical Student v. For-
malist Professor. Because the hypothetical case is identical to Gurdelle's
case, the judge's ruling on the hypothetical will control the outcome of
the real case. Consequently, depending on the hypothetical student's
construction of his hypothetical, a vicious self-reference may be achieved.
Suppose now that the hypothetical plaintiff, Critical Student, pro-
poses the following as his proposition that cannot be determined by the
law:
The law does not compel a determination that this proposition is true
when it is offered as an instance of an indeterminate proposition of the
law.
Consider the judge's dilemma when deciding how (and indeed
whether) the law determines the validity of this proposition. She might
simply assume that the law directs its truth or falsity, and then analyze
both possibilities to ascertain why this is so. In regard to the former, if
the law directs that the proposition is true, then what it asserts about the
law must be true-the law, by the terms of the proposition, does not
compel a determination that the proposition is true. Consequently, the
judge is compelled to hold that the proposition is true when, in fact, the
law does not compel a finding that the proposition is true. This is a
contradiction.
Conversely, suppose the judge were to hold that the law compels
that the proposition is false. Then, from the above analysis, the negation
of what the proposition asserts about the law is true. Because the propo-
sition asserts that the law does not compel a finding that it is true, its
negation, that the law compels a finding that it is true, must be true.
Thus, the judge is compelled to hold that the proposition is false when, in
fact, the law compels a finding that the proposition is true. Again, this is
a contradiction.
Because alternatively assuming that the law compels holding the
proposition is true and then false yields contradictions, an error must
arise from the initial assumption that the law is determinate and directs
the validity of the proposition. This does not mean that the proposition
itself is neither true nor false in some ideal sense, but merely that the law,
in respect to this particular proposition, is indeterminate.
Unfortunately, the analysis conducted above suffers from precisely
the same confusion of use and mention that occurred with the sentence
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"This statement is false." The indeterminacy arises from an abuse of
language and not from the notion of legal determinacy itself. But just as
the mistake of use and mention was purged from "This statement is
false," so too can it be exorcised from the proposition "The law does not
compel a determination that this proposition is true."
Consider the following variant of the latter proposition:
"yields a statement for which the law does not compel a finding that it
is true, when appended to its quotation" yields a statement for which
the law does not compel a finding that it is true, when appended to its
quotation.18 1
Analyzing this proposition results in precisely the same conclusion:
The law is necessarily indeterminate.18 2 Assuming the existence of a
complete system that can consistently resolve all legal propositions that
can be described in legal English results in an antimony. Using Quine's
construction, that contradiction can no longer be understood as a mere
abuse of language. Hence, just as Quine showed that the idea of a text-
based predicate resolving truth is logically incoherent,18 3 so too is the
notion of a determinate, formal legal system.
18 1. We have taken some liberties with this version of the proposition for simplicity and
clarity. A more rigorous example might be:
"yields a statement for which, when presented to a court as an example of an indeter-
minate proposition of the law under circumstances where the question of its determi-
nacy is necessary to resolve the dispute in question, the law does not compel a court
to determine that it is true, when appended to its own quotation" yields a statement
for which, when presented to a court as an example of an indeterminate proposition
of the law under circumstances where the question of its determinacy is necessary to
resolve the dispute in question, the law does not compel a court to determine that it is
true, when appended to its own quotation.
182. Assume, arguendo, that the law compels a unique determination of the truth of the
proposition. The law then must compel either a finding that the proposition is true or a finding
that it is false. If the law compels a finding that the proposition is true, then what it asserts
about the law must be true. Its assertion about the law is that the law does not compel a
finding that the proposition resulting from appending "yields a statement for which the law
does not compel a finding that it is true, when appended to its quotation," to its quotation, is
true. But the result of that operation is textually identical to the text of the proposition that we
assumed the law compelled to be true. This is a contradiction.
On the other hand, if the law compels a finding that the proposition is false, then its
assertion about the law must be false and the negation of that assertion true. The proposition
must therefore mean that the law compels finding the proposition, the text of which results
from appending "yields a statement for which the law does not compel a finding that it is true,
when appended to its quotation" to its quotation, to be true. But the result of that operation is
textually identical to the text of the proposition that we assumed the law compelled to be false.
Again, this is a contradiction.
Because in each case a contradiction results, the assumption that the law is determinate
must be false. Consequently, the law must be indeterminate with respect to this proposition.
183. See supra Part III.B.5.
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Granted, the failure of the law to determine this case can be "re-
paired" by eliminating the case from the legal system. Such an adjust-
ment, however, would effectively admit fragmentation in the law and
hence indeterminacy. Our conclusion is that the law cannot be modeled
in a determinate fashion. An indeterminate proposition can be revealed
for any interesting construction of the law.
Of course, we have not proved that every model of the law must be
inconsistent or incomplete. We have shown, however, that any system
roughly analogous to the common law of contracts, which enforces
agreements when conditions precedent are satisfied, and which does not
require that propositions that are logically false be held true, is demon-
strably indeterminate. Any legal system that rejects such fundamental
properties might be determinate but, like P-Loses, would be suspect due
to its trivial nature.1 84 We conclude that the full implications of G6del's
Theorem must apply to any meaningful formal model of the law.
IV. Legal Implications of Gbidel's Theorem
A. Hard and Easy Cases
The main question that emerges is "What does all of this mean for
lawyers and judges?" The "easy" answer is that the law (as we have
imagined it) cannot be a determinate, formal decision process. It cannot
mechanically solve all disputes. Instead, human insight and intuition
must play a part. Just as creative mathematicians are needed to help us
solve the riddles of the universe, intelligent lawyers and judges are
needed to resolve the more demanding of society's problems.
But what of the specific ramifications of Gi5del's Theorem? Are
only contrived cases that refer to themselves affected,1 85 or do the impli-
cations of G6del's result run deeper? Are certain cases determinate
notwithstanding G6del's Theorem, such that human participation is not
required in relation to these particular cases? If not exactly determinate,
are certain cases "easier" than others? Is the use of human intuition so
minimal in certain cases that we can be confident of the result?
184. See supra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.
185. Self-reference in the law is more common than one might think. See Farago, Intrac-
table Cases, supra note 4, at 205-07 (discussing self-reference in the law); see also Banner, supra
note 24, at 244-49 (noting several self-references in the law). Appellate judges sometimes di-
rectly engage in Epimenides-like reasoning while determining cases. See generally John M.
Rogers, 'T Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79
Ky. L.J. 439, 442-58 (1991) (noting "150 Supreme Court cases that might have resulted in a
justice's decision to vote against his own analysis").
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To answer the first of these questions, we note that the impact of
Gbdel's result extends far beyond self-referential cases such as Gurdelle
v. Langdelle. Gi~del's Theorem runs deeper, reaching every case that can
be imagined. For in any case whatsoever, human judgment must play a
factor in answering questions about the law. Recall the computer pro-
gram envisioned in Part 111.186 Gbdel's result demonstrates that such a
general decision program is impossible.187 Following the input of factual
data, human judgment must be referenced to enable the program to solve
the problem. At a minimum, a programmer must direct the computer to
the appropriate algorithm. 88
Recognizing that the fact of human participation cannot be avoided
in any case, one might question the degree of non-algorithmic insight
being used. Specifically, one might argue that the human judgment used
in deciding a particular case is minimal in comparison with the formal
logic used to decide the case. Or, one might assert that the human choice
in one case is not as "difficult" as that in another. The purpose behind
either argument, of course, is to minimize the importance of certain
human choices, resulting in a hierarchy of cases. Certain choices are
minor when compared with the algorithm used to solve the problem, and
these cases are relatively "easy." Other choices are "harder," meaning
that the corresponding cases are more difficult to resolve.
One who seeks to diminish the importance of human choice must
understand that measuring the value of insight is not an algorithmic
task.189 Because value in this regard cannot be algorithmically quanti-
fied, comparing the relative complexity of cases is objectively impossi-
186. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
187. If law is incomplete, then the computer program described, see supra note 139, will
not terminate for all strings. If an input is an indeterminate case, the program will never find a
dispositive argument, and will simply go on executing forever. Moreover, although determi-
nate cases will still produce correct results, a hypothetical judge, waiting for the output of a
law machine, would not be able to tell if the machine would ever produce a result unless it had
already done so.
What is worse, if law is inconsistent, the program--even if it does terminate-does not
assure that an argument for a contrary position is impossible. Thus, to assure that the case is
not "hard," the judge must wait to see if it produces a contrary argument. However, if the
case does in fact have a determinate answer, then the machine will never produce a contrary
argument. Either way, the judge must wait forever before getting a certain result from the
machine, even for those "easy" cases that are not indeterminate. See PENROSE, supra note 30,
at 117-18.
188. See id. at 63-64; cf Sartorius, supra note 65, at 1269 ("There is a uniquely correct
result in the vast majority of cases, and there is no reliable judicial criterion for identifying
those hard cases in which there is not.").
189. See PENROSE, supra note 30, at 412.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ble.190 We can never know in a formal way whether the insight that
directs a person to choose A over B is more or less complicated than that
which steers the same person to choose Y over Z. So long as choices
exist, establishing a hierarchy of cases or arguments from easy to hard is
itself a matter of insight and choice. It follows that identifying "good"
arguments, or a range of acceptable arguments, is a non-algorithmic
task. 191
Take the infamous case of the under-aged president.1 92 The Consti-
tution expressly provides that the president must be at least thirty-five
years of age. 193 Consequently, the argument goes, a twenty-nine-year-old
cannot be elected president. Any case involving a twenty-nine-year-old
candidate seeking the presidency would thus be easily resolved. All the
judge has to do is apply the prohibition of Article II of the Constitution.
The only human insight involved, if any, would lie in choosing to look at
this specific prohibition-a relatively simple choice.
Article II, however, does not provide the only choice. Professor
D'Amato has aptly observed that several arguments can be made in favor
of the twenty-nine-year-old candidate.1 94 An argument can be made that
no one has standing to challenge the candidate's age. 195 Even if a court
were to reach the merits, it might be argued that the intent of the framers
was to exclude only immature candidates.1 96 Better yet, one might argue
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit age discrimination,
and that the provision in Article II to the contrary has thus been
amended. 197
190. Penrose explains this further:
For a simple example, one will have learnt the algorithmic rules for multiplying two
numbers together and also for dividing one number by another (or one may prefer to
engage the assistance of an algorithmic pocket calculator), but how does one know
whether, for the problem in hand, one should have multiplied or divided the num-
bers? For that, one needs to think, and make a conscious judgment.
Id. at 413 (emphasis in original).
191. Professors Rogers and Molzon are consequently incorrect when they argue that an
interpretive technique within the law may render "millions of interpretations" impermissible.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
192. See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 71, at 402, 414. Judge Frank Easterbrook was
the first to posit this example. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L.
REV. 533, 536 (1983).
193. U.S. CONST. art. II. § 1, cl. 5.
194. See Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-
Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 250 (1989).
195. Id. at 253 (citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
196. Id. at 251-52.
197. Id. at 255.
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To resolve the case of the under-aged president a judge must choose
which argument she finds more persuasive. Although formal logic might
provide guidance, it cannot resolve the case. Instead, insight ultimately
must direct the judge's decision. And because this insight is not formally
measurable, one can only subjectively guess at whether the case is easy or
hard.
B. Sequences and Better Solutions
An alternative way to demonstrate indeterminacy in the law (and a
resulting absence of easy cases) involves the use of numerical sequences.
Professors Tushnet and D'Amato have both observed that given a se-
quence of three integers-say "2, 4, 6"-no single formula can be de-
duced that will predict the fourth integer.198 Put another way, the
successor integer to the sequence "2, 4, 6" is indeterminate. Given this
mathematical conclusion, the argument goes, it follows that the law too
must be indeterminate; if no single formula can be deduced from a se-
quence of integers, then no single formula can be deduced from a se-
quence of legal propositions. Moreover, legal English is more expressive
and less definite than the set of integers. Hence, legal English presents an
even greater opportunity for interpreting a given sequence than does the
set of integers.199
Undoubtedly, Professors Tushnet's and D'Amato's observations
about numerical sequences are correct. Basic computation theory proves
their point. Given any finite prefix of integers, an infinite number of algo-
rithms exist that generate the same prefix. Thus, given any finite se-
quence, an infinite number of recipes exist for establishing the next
successive number. The sequence "2, 4, 6" can thus be interpreted to
mean that the next integer is "8," or it can be interpreted to mean the
198. D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 597 n.96; Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 781, 822 (1983) [hereinafter Tushnet, Following the Rules]. Professor D'Amato de-
scribes this result as follows:
Here is how any prior theory can be used to "explain" any desired result. Sup-
pose we have the following sequence of numbers: 2, 4, 6. I ask you to give me the
next number in the series. If you say "8," you have implicitly applied one possible
theory about the sequence. But the Lowenheim-Skolem proofs showed, among other
things, that any answer at all to my question can be shown to be the consequence of
some theory. Suppose instead you give me the number 10. I then supply an appro-
priate theory: "the next number in the sequence is derived from adding the two pre-
ceding numbers, but when there is only one preceding number, add it twice."
Following this formula, 2 + 2 = 4; 2 + 4 = 6; 4 + 6 = 10, Q.E.D.
D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 597 n.96 (emphasis in original).
199. See D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 176 nn.91-92.
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successor should be "10. ' '200 Equally plausible interpretations exist for
"1,000,001" and "Jesse Jackson." All of these are "correct."
A problem arises, however, when one attempts to translate this re-
sult into legal English. Professor D'Amato attributes the proof of se-
quential indeterminacy to mathematicians Leopold L~iwenheim and
Thoralf Skolem. 20 1 Professor Ken Kress, in response, correctly observes
that the proofs of Lbwenheim and Skolem hold only for first-order for-
mal systems. 20 2 Unlike Gi~del's proof, which requires a fairly powerful
language, the proofs of Liwenheim and Skolem only apply to systems
whose base language cannot describe properties. English is a second-or-
der system; it can expressly describe properties of objects (sets) as well as
propositions about objects.203 The proofs of L6wenheim and Skolem
therefore do not necessarily hold for legal English.
The natural implication to be drawn from Professor Kress's argu-
ment is that legal English is not restricted in the same way as the set of
integers.2° 4 Although a single algorithmic recipe for the sequence "2, 4,
6" cannot be identified, a series of cases can be interpreted to produce a
specific, determinate rule. This conclusion, however, is unwarranted for
at least two reasons. First, the fact that a mathematical proof does not
"go through" into English says nothing about English's limitations. Lim-
itations may still exist; indeed, these limitations might be identical to
those disclosed by the mathematical proof. Mathematics simply fails to
reveal them.
200. See D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain?, supra note 7, at 597 n.96.
201. Id.; D'Amato, Consequences of Plain Meaning, supra note 80, at 572 & n.135. Profes-
sor Tushnet, on the other hand, does not cite to these proofs. See Tushnet, Following the
Rules, supra note 198, at 822. See generally W.V. QUINE, METHODS OF LOGIC 209-12 (4th ed.
1982) (surveying the L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems).
202. See Kress, supra note 14, at 144-45. A first-order formal system is one where the
variables of the language can only represent individual objects. In second-order systems, the
variables of a language can represent properties, or sets, of individual objects. The
L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems do not apply to higher-order systems. GEORGE BOOLOS &
RICHARD JEFFREY, COMPUTABILITY AND LOGIC 198-200 (1974).
203. Consider, for example, all collections of sentences describing properties of objects. If
English were first-order, we would only be able to extensionally discuss the sentences them-
selves, as opposed to collections of such sentences. English could only be a first-order language
if sentences such as the first sentence in this footnote were meaningless.
204. See Kress, supra note 14, at 144 ("There is therefore no reason to suppose that the
conclusion of the proof, the L6wenheim-Skolem theorem, is true in legal English (or 'words').
Moreover, as we shall see shortly, there is good reason to think it is false.") (footnote omitted).
Whereas G6del's proof derives the limitations of arithmetic by exploiting the strengths of its
underlying language, the Lbwenheim-Skolem result arises from the weaknesses of its underly-
ing language. Any language capable of extentionally defining a set admits an express counter-
example for the Lbwenheim-Skolem theorem. BOOLOS & JEFFREY, supra note 202, at 147-56.
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Second, and more important here, the Lbwenheim and Skolem
proofs need not "go through" for the principle underlying sequential in-
determinacy to apply to legal English. Indeed, the LSwenheim-Skolem
Theorems are not even necessary to demonstrate that a sequence of inte-
gers-like "2, 4, 6"-cannot be interpreted to produce a single, determi-
nate successor. 20 5 Basic computation theory is sufficient for this task.20 6
The L6wenheim-Skolem Theorems are thus superfluous to the de-
bate over indeterminacy in the law because they are unnecessary. Any
discourse over the analogies between the law and indeterminacy in nu-
merical sequences should focus on common sense rather than the intrica-
cies of L6wenheim's and Skolem's proofs. Moreover, given the
application of G6del's Theorem to legal English, any analysis based on
sequential indeterminacy should at best be understood as a schematic
illustration.
G6del's proof supplies the requisite theoretical support because it
demonstrates that human insight is always necessary to resolve legal dis-
putes. We have already seen that the degree of human insight necessary
for the resolution of any given dispute cannot be algorithmically mea-
sured.207 Hence, for any given case-no matter the precedent, no matter
how obvious the sequence-an unmeasurable intuitive choice will factor
into the decision process. A sequence of cases analogous to "2, 4, 6"
could just as easily be interpreted to mean that the next case must be
"125" as it could be read to mean that the next case must be "8". And
205. The L6wenheim and Skolem Theorems establish that a first-order formal system hav-
ing one model must also have an additional model in the space of countable integers. This
does not mean that all sequences, like "2, 4, 6," must admit equally plausible results, like "8"
or "10." Indeed, once a model for intepretation is chosen for that sequence there may well be
only one result. If anything, the Ldwenheim-Skolem Theorems merely establish that more
than one model exists for interpreting any given sequence.
206. Given any fixed prefix of integers, there exist an infinite number of algorithms that
will satisfy that prefix. MICHAEL MACHTEY & PAUL YOUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
GENERAL THEORY OF ALGORITHMS 113 (1978) (For every general recursive function, there
exist a countable infinity of functions that share the same input-output properties.). If we are
willing to accept that an algorithm somehow embodies a reasonable recipe for determining a
sequence, this would suffice to demonstrate the proposition.
Another way to see why this is so is to imagine that there exists a finite prefix for which
only one sequence provides a plausible description. Then consider the shortest such sequence
which admits only one continuation, and assume that the unique next element of that sequence
is x. Now consider the sequence that begins with the shortest sequence admitting only one
continuation, and is followed by an infinity of x + l's. If one accepts that the account just
given is a plausible description of a sequence, this contradicts the possibility that the originally
hypothesized sequence had only one determinate continuation. This denies the possibility of a
plausibly determinate finite sequence prefix.
207. See supra Part IV.A.
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neither of these results can be objectively understood as better than the
other. From an algorithmic, qualitative standpoint, they are identical.
None of this precludes the existence of a credible, non-algorithmic
method for judging the quality of responses and interpretations. As an
intuitive matter, some arguments do seem better than others. Eight
seems a more probable successor to the sequence "2, 4, 6" than does
"125." "No" seems the better response to the issue of whether a twenty-
nine-year-old can be president. But why is this true? One explanation
might be socialization. 208 Eight is perceived as the better answer because
it is the solution society more commonly recognizes. Another related
explanation might focus on simple experience. A person who encounters
the same problem again and again soon learns what works and what does
not. Although the initial choice is intuitive, experience allows the choice
to be reapplied in an algorithmic way.20 9
One of the more intriguing explanations under study today is
grounded in natural selection.210 Certain intuitive solutions are better
than others simply because they allow the decisionmaker employing
them to survive and prosper. Biological evolution allows certain insights
to survive, while others perish with those who employ them. Although
"8" is not inherently superior to "125" as a successor to the sequence "2,
4, 6," it is a better solution because one who would normally prefer "8"
is more likely to survive. Moreover, natural selection might allow for the
evolution of algorithms that employ their own variety of conscious judg-
ment-these algorithms (heuristics really) might be capable of intuitively
judging the validity of other algorithms. 211
208. See Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 198, at 823 ("we know something about
the rule to follow only because we are familiar with the social practices").
209. Penrose describes the role of experience thus:
Of course, once one has done a large number of similar problems, the decision ...
may become second nature and can be carried out algorithmically-presumably by
the cerebellum. At that stage, awareness is no longer necessary, and it becomes safe
to allow one's conscious mind to wander and to contemplate other matters-
although, from time to time one may need to check that the algorithm has not been
sidetracked in some (perhaps subtle) way.
PENROSE, supra note 30, at 413.
210. Id. at 414-16.
211. See generally HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS, supra note 44, at 547-603 (dis-
cussing the "natural selection" rationale for justifying analogies); DOUGLAS R. HOFsTADTER,
MIT ARTIFICIAL INTELLEGENCE LAB. MEMORANDUM No. 755, THE COPYCAT PROJECT:
AN EXPERIMENT IN NONDETERMINISM AND CREATIVE ANALOGIES (1984) (design for sys-
tems capable of doing analogies with the insight and short sight of humans). But see PENROSE,
supra note 30, at 414 ("I do not see how natural selection, in itself, can evolve algorithms
which could have the kind of conscious judgements of the validity of other algorithms that we
seem to have.") (emphasis in original).
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V. Conclusion
Gddel's proof reveals that the law cannot be a determinate formal
system. Like mathematics, the law is either incomplete and must look
outside itself for guidance, or it is inconsistent and contradicts itself. As
a mechanical system, the law is and must be indeterminate.
For reasons that have not been made entirely clear, mainstream
legal thought has expressed a definite aversion to indeterminacy. We sus-
pect the true reason rests in anxiety over the unknown-the human ten-
dency to fear that which is not understood. In the legal community, this
fear has translated itself into a general presumption that anything less
than formalism must be nihilistic.
G6del's Theorem, however, is not a tool of nihilism. It does not
disparage the usefulness of algorithms and formal systems; it merely
demonstrates their limitations. Following G6del's discovery in 1931,
mathematical studies did not cease; rather, they proceeded at a higher
level than ever before. Recognition of the limits of formalism allowed
mathematicians (and today's computer scientists) to "see" 212 things
never before envisioned. Scholars in these hard sciences consider GbSdel's
result "an occasion, not for dejection, but for a renewed appreciation of
the powers of creative reason. '213
Gbdel's result, of course, constrains what might be accomplished
with the legal system. First, incompleteness and inconsistency reduce
the law's reliability and predictability. Because human judgment and in-
tuition are not fungible commodities, achieving certainty or equality of
result is impossible. Second, G6del's Theorem discloses that America's
ideal of the "rule of law" can never be fully achieved. Like it or not, the
application of legal principles depends on human intuition. Conse-
quently, the American government, as administered through its legal sys-
tem, is-and can only be-one of people as well as laws. Finally, G6del's
Theorem dilutes any strict vision of representative government. Though
elected representatives pass laws, the judiciary applies them. Judicial in-
sight necessarily affects the law's impact on the population, and judicial
legislation must be recognized as an inevitable component of
government.
As in mathematics, Gbdel's result should be welcomed for these rev-
elations. Although an absence of formalism means that law cannot be
perfectly reliable, it is the recognition of uncertainty that is the key to an
ordered society. G6del's Theorem allows society to anticipate risk and
212. On the "seeing" process, see Roger Penrose's remarks quoted supra at note 165.
213. NAGEL & NEWMAN, supra note 130, at 102; see id. at 101-02.
plan accordingly. In addition, the deconstruction of legal formalism
ought to bring greater individual accountability to government. No
longer should officials be heard to hide behind "the law," for the simple
reason that the law does not independently exist. Finally, because the
facade of pristine republicanism214 is removed by Gbdel's result, the judi-
ciary is exposed as a true body politic. "Decisions" and "interpreta-
tions" must rely on human choices and hunches-subjective
determinations that cannot be quantified. 215
214. The "separation of powers" theory, of course, teaches that the legislature "makes"
law, and the judiciary only applies it. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential
Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 699 (1991) (The "broad 'formalist' argu-
ment" is "that the 'law' consists of the statute's text as voted on by the legislature and signed
by the President.").
215. For this reason, formalist suggestions (such as that by Justice Scalia) that a statute's
meaning can be gleaned from its text should be taken with a large grain of salt. Justice Scalia
has explained his position as follows:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis
of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord
with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by
the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute .... and (2) most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be inte-
grated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has
in mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative material discussed
by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that
these factors suggest.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (emphasis in original). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]f the language of a statute is clear, that language must
be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity."). See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (expounding upon and
supporting Scalia's basic position).
Scalia's argument ignores the implications of Gbdel's Theorem. Because the law is in-
complete or inconsistent, no interpreter can be certain in an objective manner that he or she
has correctly deciphered the meaning and application of a given proposition. For this reason,
excluding any particular source of meaning is at best an arbitrary exercise, and at worst reflects
an unencumbered arrogance. Compare Professor D'Amato's view:
The opinions of Justice Scalia urging courts not to use legislative history is in my
view a welcome development from the perspective of reducing the legal fees that
otherwise would be run up by lawyers on both sides poring over volumes of legisla-
tive history. But Justice Scalia has no doctrinal justification for his stance; his prefer-
ence for "plain meaning" of statutes is no less indeterminate than recourse to
legislative history. He has simply traded one indeterminacy for another. The trade is
desirable only to the extent that it may reduce transaction costs (legal fees).
D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, supra note 9, at 175 n.88.
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